Transaction::from_json holds an input txid that is not 64 hex digits and writes the input as spending the zero txid

Exploitation

No confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next marks exploitation only from CISA KEV.

CVSS

5.3 · CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N

EPSS

No dated EPSS signal available.

As published by the source; long descriptions are shortened.

`Transaction::from_json`, for a document with no `hex` member, held each input's `txid` member as given. An input `txid` that is not 64 hex digits (`"zz"`, `""`, 63 or 65 digits, characters that are not hex digits) answered `Ok`: `source_txid` and `to_json` gave the text back, while `to_binary` wrote the input as spending the txid of 32 zero bytes and `id()` hashed those bytes. Documents naming different texts were one transaction, spending an outpoint none of them named. An application that reads a peer's transaction document with `from_json` and relies both on the text of its inputs and on its bytes or `id()` is affected; one that reads only documents it produced is not. 0.8.6 refuses such a txid (`Invalid txid of input N: expected 64 hex digits`). Where upgrading is not possible, require each input's `txid` to be 64 ASCII hex digits before calling `from_json`.

Published by the source

11 Nov 2026, 12:00 UTC

Last modified by the source

12 Nov 2026, 08:00 UTC

Source last checked

13 Nov 2026, 06:40 UTC

1. Revision 1 · created · 13 Nov 2026

   Published from osv record RUSTSEC-2026-0497

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# Patch Next advisory brief: GHSA-84xq-3662-pvx5

Advisory: Transaction::from_json holds an input txid that is not 64 hex digits and writes the input as spending the zero txid
IDs: GHSA-84xq-3662-pvx5
Record: https://patchnext.com/advisories/rustsec-2026-0497 (revision 1, source checked 13 Nov 2026, 06:40 UTC)
Inventory: none attached. This brief comes from a public page and does not say whether any deployment is affected.
Severity: Medium (CVSS 5.3)
Exploitation: no confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next confirms exploitation only from CISA KEV.
Vendor response: Vendor fix available; fixed versions by package: bsv-rs 0.9.0-beta.7.0, 0.8.6. A vendor fix does not mean a deployment is fixed.

## Affected components
- crates.io bsv-rs: affected >= 0.0.0-0, < 0.8.6; >= 0.9.0-beta.1, < 0.9.0-beta.7.0; fixed in 0.9.0-beta.7.0, 0.8.6

## Suggested inspection (read-only)
- crates.io bsv-rs: check the installed version with your package manager.

## Supported action
Upgrade each affected component to a fixed version on its release line. For a transitive dependency, upgrade the parent package or add an override or constraint, then regenerate the lockfile. Redeploy every environment that ran an affected version.

## Required regression checks
- Run the test suite and a production build.
- Exercise the features that depend on bsv-rs.
- Repeat the inspection and confirm that only fixed versions remain installed.

## Rollback considerations
- Keep the previous lockfile and deployment artifact. Rolling back reinstates the vulnerable version, so apply any documented mitigation while you fix forward.

## Unresolved questions
- Which deployments run an affected version?
- Exploitation status can change. Check again before lowering the priority.
- Mark the work resolved only after the fixed version is verified in production.

## Sources
- Verified: https://osv.dev/vulnerability/RUSTSEC-2026-0497 (OSV record RUSTSEC-2026-0497 lists affected ranges: crates.io bsv-rs >=0.0.0-0 =0.9.0-beta.1 <0.9.0-beta.7.0 (fixed))

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