Out-of-bounds read when decoding internal keys shorter than 16 bytes

Exploitation

No confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next marks exploitation only from CISA KEV.

CVSS

7.9 · CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:L

EPSS

No dated EPSS signal available.

As published by the source; long descriptions are shortened.

`InternalKeyRef::from_encoded` is a safe constructor whose only length check is `debug_assert!(encoded.len() >= 16)`, which is compiled out in release builds. Its accessors perform unchecked length arithmetic on the slice: `user_key()` slices `&encoded[..len - 16]`, `trailer()`/`seq_num()` pass `len - 16` and `timestamp()` passes `len - 8` to `read_u64_be`, which computes `buffer.as_ptr().add(offset)` and performs an 8-byte load. For a short slice the subtraction underflows `usize`, the pointer wraps below the allocation and eight bytes before the buffer are read (undefined behavior; confirmed with AddressSanitizer as a `heap-buffer-overflow`). In debug builds the same call panics instead. The same invariant is missing at the on-disk decode boundary: `BlockIterator::seek_next_entry` rebuilds the current key from block bytes with upper-bound checks only, and `BlockIterator::key()` wraps it in `InternalKeyRef`, which `surrealdb`'s `kv-surrealkv` backend then reads through…

Published by the source

3 Nov 2026, 12:00 UTC

Last modified by the source

6 Nov 2026, 15:45 UTC

Source last checked

7 Nov 2026, 06:30 UTC

1. Revision 1 · created · 7 Nov 2026

   Published from osv record RUSTSEC-2026-0452

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# Patch Next advisory brief: GHSA-9fm9-c4h4-8g93

Advisory: Out-of-bounds read when decoding internal keys shorter than 16 bytes
IDs: GHSA-9fm9-c4h4-8g93
Record: https://patchnext.com/advisories/rustsec-2026-0452 (revision 1, source checked 7 Nov 2026, 06:30 UTC)
Inventory: none attached. This brief comes from a public page and does not say whether any deployment is affected.
Severity: High (CVSS 7.9)
Exploitation: no confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next confirms exploitation only from CISA KEV.
Vendor response: Vendor fix available; fixed versions by package: surrealkv 1.2.0. A vendor fix does not mean a deployment is fixed.

## Affected components
- crates.io surrealkv: affected >= 0.0.0-0, < 1.2.0; fixed in 1.2.0

## Suggested inspection (read-only)
- crates.io surrealkv: check the installed version with your package manager.

## Supported action
Upgrade each affected component to a fixed version on its release line. For a transitive dependency, upgrade the parent package or add an override or constraint, then regenerate the lockfile. Redeploy every environment that ran an affected version.

## Required regression checks
- Run the test suite and a production build.
- Exercise the features that depend on surrealkv.
- Repeat the inspection and confirm that only fixed versions remain installed.

## Rollback considerations
- Keep the previous lockfile and deployment artifact. Rolling back reinstates the vulnerable version, so apply any documented mitigation while you fix forward.

## Unresolved questions
- Which deployments run an affected version?
- Exploitation status can change. Check again before lowering the priority.
- Mark the work resolved only after the fixed version is verified in production.

## Sources
- Verified: https://osv.dev/vulnerability/RUSTSEC-2026-0452 (OSV record RUSTSEC-2026-0452 lists affected ranges: crates.io surrealkv >=0.0.0-0 <1.2.0 (fixed))

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