Path traversal in rio-vt Kitty graphics protocol handler allows out-of-bounds file delete (and read)

Exploitation

No confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next marks exploitation only from CISA KEV.

CVSS

4.7 · CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N

EPSS

No dated EPSS signal available.

As published by the source; long descriptions are shortened.

The Kitty graphics protocol handler in `rio-vt` builds a filesystem path from an attacker-controlled APC escape sequence and, for the temp-file medium, only checks that the path *contains the substring* `"tty-graphics-protocol"` before it opens, reads, and `remove_file`s it. There is no `..` rejection and no canonicalization, so a path containing the marker substring plus `..` escapes the terminal's temp directory (path traversal, CWE-22/CWE-23). Because a terminal renders whatever arrives on the PTY (ssh output, a `cat`'d file, CI logs), untrusted output can delete a file outside the temp area and cause its bytes to be read back in.

Details The sink is `create_graphic_data()` in `src/ansi/kitty_graphics_protocol.rs`, in the `TransmissionMedium::TempFile` branch, reachable through the public API `rio_vt::ansi::kitty_graphics_protocol::parse`. The path is the base64 APC payload of an `a=t,t=t` command, and the guard is: ```rust let path = Path::new(path_str); if !path.is_file() {…

Published by the source

1 Nov 2026, 12:00 UTC

Last modified by the source

2 Nov 2026, 11:00 UTC

Source last checked

3 Nov 2026, 06:10 UTC

1. Revision 1 · created · 3 Nov 2026

   Published from osv record RUSTSEC-2026-0430

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# Patch Next advisory brief: rustsec-2026-0430

Advisory: Path traversal in `rio-vt` Kitty graphics protocol handler allows out-of-bounds file delete (and read)
IDs: rustsec-2026-0430
Record: https://patchnext.com/advisories/rustsec-2026-0430 (revision 1, source checked 3 Nov 2026, 06:10 UTC)
Inventory: none attached. This brief comes from a public page and does not say whether any deployment is affected.
Severity: Medium (CVSS 4.7)
Exploitation: no confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next confirms exploitation only from CISA KEV.
Vendor response: Vendor fix available; fixed versions by package: rio-vt 0.5.29. A vendor fix does not mean a deployment is fixed.

## Affected components
- crates.io rio-vt: affected >= 0.0.0-0, < 0.5.29; fixed in 0.5.29

## Suggested inspection (read-only)
- crates.io rio-vt: check the installed version with your package manager.

## Supported action
Upgrade each affected component to a fixed version on its release line. For a transitive dependency, upgrade the parent package or add an override or constraint, then regenerate the lockfile. Redeploy every environment that ran an affected version.

## Required regression checks
- Run the test suite and a production build.
- Exercise the features that depend on rio-vt.
- Repeat the inspection and confirm that only fixed versions remain installed.

## Rollback considerations
- Keep the previous lockfile and deployment artifact. Rolling back reinstates the vulnerable version, so apply any documented mitigation while you fix forward.

## Unresolved questions
- Which deployments run an affected version?
- Exploitation status can change. Check again before lowering the priority.
- Mark the work resolved only after the fixed version is verified in production.

## Sources
- Verified: https://osv.dev/vulnerability/RUSTSEC-2026-0430 (OSV record RUSTSEC-2026-0430 lists affected ranges: crates.io rio-vt >=0.0.0-0 <0.5.29 (fixed))

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