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BLAKE2b produces wrong tag when using reset() with a different-length key

GHSA-xcc6-f2jq-43x6

What to do

Vendor fix available. Upgrade each affected package to the fixed version on its release line (orion 0.18.1, 0.17.16), redeploy, then verify what is actually installed.

This page has no inventory attached, so it cannot say whether you are affected. A vendor fix is not proof that your deployment is fixed.

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Affected packages

  • crates.io orion

    Affected
    >= 0.0.0-0, < 0.17.16>= 0.18.0-0, < 0.18.1
    Fixed in
    0.17.16, 0.18.1

Sources

Severity and exploitation
Exploitation
No confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next marks exploitation only from CISA KEV.
CVSS
not scored
EPSS
No dated EPSS signal available.
Source description

As published by the source; long descriptions are shortened.

Summary `hazardous::mac::blake2b::Blake2b::reset()` does not correctly reset the state when a key is supplied that has a different length than the one used upon initialization with `hazardous::mac::blake2b::Blake2b::new()`, because it errorneously uses a cached length.

Impact Initialization `hazardous::mac::blake2b::Blake2b` with a key of some length `N`, followed by a reset with a key of length `!= N` will produce an incorrect BLAKE2b tag, causing `hazardous::mac::blake2b::Blake2b::verify()` to fail. This means under honest protocol conditions, parties could experience failing tag verifications.

Resolution Upgrade to `v0.17.16` or `v0.18.1`.

Dates and revisions
Published by the source
Last modified by the source
Source last checked
  1. Revision 1 · created ·

    Published from osv record RUSTSEC-2026-0428

Agent brief

Preview the exact text before you copy it. Commands are read-only suggestions; review them before running anything.

# Patch Next advisory brief: GHSA-xcc6-f2jq-43x6

Advisory: BLAKE2b produces wrong tag when using `reset()` with a different-length key
IDs: GHSA-xcc6-f2jq-43x6
Record: https://patchnext.com/advisories/rustsec-2026-0428 (revision 1, source checked 31 Oct 2026, 06:45 UTC)
Inventory: none attached. This brief comes from a public page and does not say whether any deployment is affected.
Severity: Unrated
Exploitation: no confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next confirms exploitation only from CISA KEV.
Vendor response: Vendor fix available; fixed versions by package: orion 0.18.1, 0.17.16. A vendor fix does not mean a deployment is fixed.

## Affected components
- crates.io orion: affected >= 0.0.0-0, < 0.17.16; >= 0.18.0-0, < 0.18.1; fixed in 0.17.16, 0.18.1

## Suggested inspection (read-only)
- crates.io orion: check the installed version with your package manager.

## Supported action
Upgrade each affected component to a fixed version on its release line. For a transitive dependency, upgrade the parent package or add an override or constraint, then regenerate the lockfile. Redeploy every environment that ran an affected version.

## Required regression checks
- Run the test suite and a production build.
- Exercise the features that depend on orion.
- Repeat the inspection and confirm that only fixed versions remain installed.

## Rollback considerations
- Keep the previous lockfile and deployment artifact. Rolling back reinstates the vulnerable version, so apply any documented mitigation while you fix forward.

## Unresolved questions
- Which deployments run an affected version?
- Exploitation status can change. Check again before lowering the priority.
- Mark the work resolved only after the fixed version is verified in production.

## Sources
- Verified: https://osv.dev/vulnerability/RUSTSEC-2026-0428 (OSV record RUSTSEC-2026-0428 lists affected ranges: crates.io orion >=0.0.0-0 =0.18.0-0 <0.18.1 (fixed))

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