Unbounded growth of pending connection ID retirements in quinn-proto

Exploitation

No confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next marks exploitation only from CISA KEV.

CVSS

not scored

EPSS

No dated EPSS signal available.

As published by the source; long descriptions are shortened.

When processing a NEW_CONNECTION_ID frame, quinn-proto queues a RETIRE_CONNECTION_ID frame for each connection ID that the peer asked it to retire. The normal path bounds this queue and closes the connection with a CONNECTION_ID_LIMIT_ERROR if the bound would be exceeded. However, the path handling a connection ID that had already been retired pushed onto the queue without applying the limit and without deduplicating. A peer that has completed the handshake can first send a NEW_CONNECTION_ID frame with a large `retire_prior_to` value to advance the receiver's connection ID window, and then repeatedly send NEW_CONNECTION_ID frames with sequence numbers below that window. Each such frame adds another entry to the queue. The queue is only drained by sending RETIRE_CONNECTION_ID frames, which are subject to congestion control, so a peer that withholds acknowledgements can stall the drain while continuing to flood, growing the victim's memory use without bound. The flaw was corrected in…

Published by the source

17 Aug 2026, 12:00 UTC

Last modified by the source

12 Oct 2026, 18:15 UTC

Source last checked

23 Oct 2026, 22:04 UTC

1. Revision 1 · created · 24 Oct 2026

   Published from osv record RUSTSEC-2026-0339

Preview the exact text before you copy it. Commands are read-only suggestions; review them before running anything.

# Patch Next advisory brief: GHSA-hmxj-32vh-65vr

Advisory: Unbounded growth of pending connection ID retirements in quinn-proto
IDs: GHSA-hmxj-32vh-65vr
Record: https://patchnext.com/advisories/rustsec-2026-0339 (revision 1, source checked 23 Oct 2026, 22:04 UTC)
Inventory: none attached. This brief comes from a public page and does not say whether any deployment is affected.
Severity: Unrated
Exploitation: no confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next confirms exploitation only from CISA KEV.
Vendor response: Vendor fix available; fixed versions by package: quinn-proto 0.11.17. A vendor fix does not mean a deployment is fixed.

## Affected components
- crates.io quinn-proto: affected >= 0.6.0, < 0.11.17; fixed in 0.11.17

## Suggested inspection (read-only)
- crates.io quinn-proto: check the installed version with your package manager.

## Supported action
Upgrade each affected component to a fixed version on its release line. For a transitive dependency, upgrade the parent package or add an override or constraint, then regenerate the lockfile. Redeploy every environment that ran an affected version.

## Required regression checks
- Run the test suite and a production build.
- Exercise the features that depend on quinn-proto.
- Repeat the inspection and confirm that only fixed versions remain installed.

## Rollback considerations
- Keep the previous lockfile and deployment artifact. Rolling back reinstates the vulnerable version, so apply any documented mitigation while you fix forward.

## Unresolved questions
- Which deployments run an affected version?
- Exploitation status can change. Check again before lowering the priority.
- Mark the work resolved only after the fixed version is verified in production.

## Sources
- Verified: https://osv.dev/vulnerability/RUSTSEC-2026-0339 (OSV record RUSTSEC-2026-0339 lists affected ranges: crates.io quinn-proto >=0.6.0 <0.11.17 (fixed))

Commands are suggestions: review each one before running it.