decompress: tar-family extractors write archive entries without a path-traversal check (tar-slip)
What to do
Vendor response not established. Follow the primary source's mitigation guidance and check back for a fix.
This page has no inventory attached, so it cannot say whether you are affected. A vendor fix is not proof that your deployment is fixed.
Affected packages
crates.io decompress
- Affected
- >= 0.0.0-0
- Fixed in
- no fixed version recorded
Sources
- Open Source Vulnerabilities (OSV.dev), including the GitHub Advisory Database
OSV record RUSTSEC-2026-0328 lists affected ranges: crates.io decompress >=0.0.0-0
VerifiedObserved Structured OSV record; not marked as GitHub-reviewed.
Severity and exploitation
- Exploitation
- No confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next marks exploitation only from CISA KEV.
- CVSS
- 7.1 · CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H
- EPSS
- No dated EPSS signal available.
Source description
As published by the source; long descriptions are shortened.
The tar-family extractors in `decompress` (`.tar`, `.tar.gz`, `.tar.xz`, `.tar.bz2`, `.tar.zst`) build each output path from the raw archive entry path and write to it with no traversal check, so a malicious archive can write files outside the destination directory, a "tar-slip" / zip-slip path traversal (CWE-22 / CWE-23). In `src/decompressors/tar_common.rs` (`tar_extract`): ```rust let filepath = entry.path()?; // raw entry path let filepath = filepath.components().skip(opts.strip).collect:: (); // strips leading components only — keeps `..` let outpath = to.join(filepath); // ... let mut outfile = fs::File::create(&outpath)?; // writes anywhere ``` `.components().skip(opts.strip)` removes a fixed number of *leading* path components but leaves interior `..` components intact so an entry named e.g. `../../../../home/ /.bashrc`, or an absolute path, resolves outside `to`. This affects all platforms.
Dates and revisions
- Published by the source
- Last modified by the source
- Source last checked
- Revision 1 · created ·
Published from osv record RUSTSEC-2026-0328
Agent brief
Preview the exact text before you copy it. Commands are read-only suggestions; review them before running anything.
# Patch Next advisory brief: rustsec-2026-0328 Advisory: `decompress`: tar-family extractors write archive entries without a path-traversal check (tar-slip) IDs: rustsec-2026-0328 Record: https://patchnext.com/advisories/rustsec-2026-0328 (revision 1, source checked 23 Oct 2026, 22:04 UTC) Inventory: none attached. This brief comes from a public page and does not say whether any deployment is affected. Severity: High (CVSS 7.1) Exploitation: no confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next confirms exploitation only from CISA KEV. Vendor response: Vendor response not established. A vendor fix does not mean a deployment is fixed. ## Affected components - crates.io decompress: affected >= 0.0.0-0 ## Suggested inspection (read-only) - crates.io decompress: check the installed version with your package manager. ## Supported action No complete vendor fix is recorded. Follow the primary source's mitigation guidance and check this record again before closing anything. ## Required regression checks - Run the test suite and a production build. - Exercise the features that depend on decompress. - Repeat the inspection and confirm that only fixed versions remain installed. ## Rollback considerations - Keep the previous lockfile and deployment artifact. Rolling back reinstates the vulnerable version, so apply any documented mitigation while you fix forward. ## Unresolved questions - Which deployments run an affected version? - Exploitation status can change. Check again before lowering the priority. - Mark the work resolved only after the fixed version is verified in production. ## Sources - Verified: https://osv.dev/vulnerability/RUSTSEC-2026-0328 (OSV record RUSTSEC-2026-0328 lists affected ranges: crates.io decompress >=0.0.0-0) Commands are suggestions: review each one before running it.
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