A 512-byte workbook can provoke a multi-gigabyte allocation and abort the process

Exploitation

No confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next marks exploitation only from CISA KEV.

CVSS

5.5 · CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H

EPSS

No dated EPSS signal available.

As published by the source; long descriptions are shortened.

Affected versions passed caller-supplied bytes to `calamine`'s `Xlsx::new` without first checking that they were a ZIP archive. `Xlsx::new` tests for password protection on its first line, which parses the input as an OLE/CFB container, and a sector-count field read from the file's own header reaches `Vec::with_capacity` without being checked against the file's actual length. A 512-byte input can therefore request several gigabytes; 9,261,285,372 bytes was measured. The oversized allocation is always attempted. Whether it aborts depends on what the allocator can satisfy. On a large host with overcommit the reservation is granted untouched and the call returns an ordinary "not an xlsx file" error, which looks like a malformed file being correctly rejected. Under a memory limit the same bytes give `memory allocation of N bytes failed` and the process aborts, which is not a `Result` a caller can handle. Containers with a memory limit, small hosts and CI runners are where this lands,…

Published by the source

29 Sep 2026, 12:00 UTC

Last modified by the source

1 Oct 2026, 07:45 UTC

Source last checked

23 Oct 2026, 22:04 UTC

1. Revision 1 · created · 24 Oct 2026

   Published from osv record RUSTSEC-2026-0317

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# Patch Next advisory brief: GHSA-w5x2-6474-pqp4

Advisory: A 512-byte workbook can provoke a multi-gigabyte allocation and abort the process
IDs: GHSA-w5x2-6474-pqp4
Record: https://patchnext.com/advisories/rustsec-2026-0317 (revision 1, source checked 23 Oct 2026, 22:04 UTC)
Inventory: none attached. This brief comes from a public page and does not say whether any deployment is affected.
Severity: Medium (CVSS 5.5)
Exploitation: no confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next confirms exploitation only from CISA KEV.
Vendor response: Vendor fix available; fixed versions by package: sheets-diff 3.2.0. A vendor fix does not mean a deployment is fixed.

## Affected components
- crates.io sheets-diff: affected >= 0.0.0-0, < 3.2.0; fixed in 3.2.0

## Suggested inspection (read-only)
- crates.io sheets-diff: check the installed version with your package manager.

## Supported action
Upgrade each affected component to a fixed version on its release line. For a transitive dependency, upgrade the parent package or add an override or constraint, then regenerate the lockfile. Redeploy every environment that ran an affected version.

## Required regression checks
- Run the test suite and a production build.
- Exercise the features that depend on sheets-diff.
- Repeat the inspection and confirm that only fixed versions remain installed.

## Rollback considerations
- Keep the previous lockfile and deployment artifact. Rolling back reinstates the vulnerable version, so apply any documented mitigation while you fix forward.

## Unresolved questions
- Which deployments run an affected version?
- Exploitation status can change. Check again before lowering the priority.
- Mark the work resolved only after the fixed version is verified in production.

## Sources
- Verified: https://osv.dev/vulnerability/RUSTSEC-2026-0317 (OSV record RUSTSEC-2026-0317 lists affected ranges: crates.io sheets-diff >=0.0.0-0 <3.2.0 (fixed))

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