Use-after-free in clear and retain when an element's Drop panics
What to do
Vendor fix available. Upgrade each affected package to the fixed version on its release line (skiplist 1.1.1), redeploy, then verify what is actually installed.
This page has no inventory attached, so it cannot say whether you are affected. A vendor fix is not proof that your deployment is fixed.
Affected packages
crates.io skiplist
- Affected
- >= 0.0.0-0, < 1.1.1
- Fixed in
- 1.1.1
Sources
- Open Source Vulnerabilities (OSV.dev), including the GitHub Advisory Database
OSV record RUSTSEC-2026-0300 lists affected ranges: crates.io skiplist >=0.0.0-0 <1.1.1 (fixed)
VerifiedObserved Structured OSV record; not marked as GitHub-reviewed.
Severity and exploitation
- Exploitation
- No confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next marks exploitation only from CISA KEV.
- CVSS
- not scored
- EPSS
- No dated EPSS signal available.
Source description
As published by the source; long descriptions are shortened.
`SkipList::clear` drops the node chain and only then resets `tail` and `len`. The drop runs each element's `Drop`, and `T` carries no bounds excluding a panicking one. If it unwinds, `tail` still points at the freed node while `len` stays non-zero. `back()`, `back_mut()`, `last_key_value()` and `last()` dereference `tail` through `unsafe`, so reading the container after the unwind is a use-after-free (CWE-416). `Drop for SkipList` calls `Box::from_raw` on `self.head`, which `clear` already destroyed, so dropping the container is a double free (CWE-415). `retain`, `retain_mut` and `dedup_by` reach the same state through `Node::filter_rebuild`, which frees nodes and runs a user predicate before the caller commits `tail` and `len`. There the head links are left partially rewired, so traversal can also reach freed nodes.
Mitigation Update to 1.1.1.
Dates and revisions
- Published by the source
- Last modified by the source
- Source last checked
- Revision 1 · created ·
Published from osv record RUSTSEC-2026-0300
Agent brief
Preview the exact text before you copy it. Commands are read-only suggestions; review them before running anything.
# Patch Next advisory brief: GHSA-x6j6-3ffp-qrfr Advisory: Use-after-free in `clear` and `retain` when an element's `Drop` panics IDs: GHSA-x6j6-3ffp-qrfr Record: https://patchnext.com/advisories/rustsec-2026-0300 (revision 1, source checked 23 Oct 2026, 22:04 UTC) Inventory: none attached. This brief comes from a public page and does not say whether any deployment is affected. Severity: Unrated Exploitation: no confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next confirms exploitation only from CISA KEV. Vendor response: Vendor fix available; fixed versions by package: skiplist 1.1.1. A vendor fix does not mean a deployment is fixed. ## Affected components - crates.io skiplist: affected >= 0.0.0-0, < 1.1.1; fixed in 1.1.1 ## Suggested inspection (read-only) - crates.io skiplist: check the installed version with your package manager. ## Supported action Upgrade each affected component to a fixed version on its release line. For a transitive dependency, upgrade the parent package or add an override or constraint, then regenerate the lockfile. Redeploy every environment that ran an affected version. ## Required regression checks - Run the test suite and a production build. - Exercise the features that depend on skiplist. - Repeat the inspection and confirm that only fixed versions remain installed. ## Rollback considerations - Keep the previous lockfile and deployment artifact. Rolling back reinstates the vulnerable version, so apply any documented mitigation while you fix forward. ## Unresolved questions - Which deployments run an affected version? - Exploitation status can change. Check again before lowering the priority. - Mark the work resolved only after the fixed version is verified in production. ## Sources - Verified: https://osv.dev/vulnerability/RUSTSEC-2026-0300 (OSV record RUSTSEC-2026-0300 lists affected ranges: crates.io skiplist >=0.0.0-0 <1.1.1 (fixed)) Commands are suggestions: review each one before running it.
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