Skip to content
Patch Next
Sign inAdd to your agent

← Actionable
Unrated

Double free in OwnedAlloc::drop_in_place when the contained value's Drop panics

What to do

Vendor response not established. Follow the primary source's mitigation guidance and check back for a fix.

This page has no inventory attached, so it cannot say whether you are affected. A vendor fix is not proof that your deployment is fixed.

Add to your agent

Affected packages

  • crates.io owned-alloc

    Affected
    >= 0.0.0-0
    Fixed in
    no fixed version recorded

Sources

Severity and exploitation
Exploitation
No confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next marks exploitation only from CISA KEV.
CVSS
not scored
EPSS
No dated EPSS signal available.
Source description

As published by the source; long descriptions are shortened.

`OwnedAlloc::drop_in_place` destroys the contained value by hand, then commits the ownership transfer with `mem::forget(self)` — which lives inside `into_raw` and so runs only after the destruction. `T::drop` is user code and may panic. If it does, the forget is skipped and the still-live `OwnedAlloc` unwinds, whose destructor drops the same `T` a second time and then deallocates. For a `T` that owns an allocation, the same block is freed twice — a double free (CWE-415). That destructor also reads the already-destroyed value through `Layout::for_value` before deallocating, a use-after-free (CWE-416). `MaybeUninitAlloc::drop_in_place` delegates to the same function, so both public entry points are affected. Storing a value whose `Drop` can panic and calling either is enough — no `unsafe` on the caller's side.

Fix No fixed release is available. The crate has had no release since 2018 and the maintainer has not responded to the report, nor to the one on `lockfree`, which is published…

Dates and revisions
Published by the source
Last modified by the source
Source last checked
  1. Revision 1 · created ·

    Published from osv record RUSTSEC-2026-0291

Agent brief

Preview the exact text before you copy it. Commands are read-only suggestions; review them before running anything.

# Patch Next advisory brief: rustsec-2026-0291

Advisory: Double free in `OwnedAlloc::drop_in_place` when the contained value's `Drop` panics
IDs: rustsec-2026-0291
Record: https://patchnext.com/advisories/rustsec-2026-0291 (revision 1, source checked 23 Oct 2026, 22:04 UTC)
Inventory: none attached. This brief comes from a public page and does not say whether any deployment is affected.
Severity: Unrated
Exploitation: no confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next confirms exploitation only from CISA KEV.
Vendor response: Vendor response not established. A vendor fix does not mean a deployment is fixed.

## Affected components
- crates.io owned-alloc: affected >= 0.0.0-0

## Suggested inspection (read-only)
- crates.io owned-alloc: check the installed version with your package manager.

## Supported action
No complete vendor fix is recorded. Follow the primary source's mitigation guidance and check this record again before closing anything.

## Required regression checks
- Run the test suite and a production build.
- Exercise the features that depend on owned-alloc.
- Repeat the inspection and confirm that only fixed versions remain installed.

## Rollback considerations
- Keep the previous lockfile and deployment artifact. Rolling back reinstates the vulnerable version, so apply any documented mitigation while you fix forward.

## Unresolved questions
- Which deployments run an affected version?
- Exploitation status can change. Check again before lowering the priority.
- Mark the work resolved only after the fixed version is verified in production.

## Sources
- Verified: https://osv.dev/vulnerability/RUSTSEC-2026-0291 (OSV record RUSTSEC-2026-0291 lists affected ranges: crates.io owned-alloc >=0.0.0-0)

Commands are suggestions: review each one before running it.

Loading voting…