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Double free in Map::into_iter and an uninitialized Arc in SharedIncin::clear

What to do

Vendor response not established. Follow the primary source's mitigation guidance and check back for a fix.

This page has no inventory attached, so it cannot say whether you are affected. A vendor fix is not proof that your deployment is fixed.

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Affected packages

  • crates.io lockfree

    Affected
    >= 0.0.0-0
    Fixed in
    no fixed version recorded

Sources

Severity and exploitation
Exploitation
No confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next marks exploitation only from CISA KEV.
CVSS
not scored
EPSS
No dated EPSS signal available.
Source description

As published by the source; long descriptions are shortened.

Two independent soundness problems, both reachable from safe Rust. `Map::into_iter` drops `builder` (the caller-supplied hasher `H`) and `incin` by hand, then commits the ownership transfer with `mem::forget(self)`. `H::drop` is user code and may panic. If it does, `mem::forget(self)` is skipped and the still-live `Map` unwinds, whose field drop glue destroys `builder` a second time. An empty map is enough — no entries or concurrency required. `SharedIncin::clear` writes `mem::uninitialized:: >()` into `self.inner` before taking the real `Arc` out. `Arc` has a validity invariant, so this is undefined behaviour at the point of creation, with no panic or concurrency involved. Between that write and the repairing one, `self.inner` also holds garbage while `self` is still droppable, so an unwind from `incin.clear()` or `Arc::new` decrements a refcount through an uninitialized pointer. The `make_shared_incin!` macro is instantiated five times, so this covers `queue`, `stack`, `map`,…

Dates and revisions
Published by the source
Last modified by the source
Source last checked
  1. Revision 1 · created ·

    Published from osv record RUSTSEC-2026-0284

Agent brief

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# Patch Next advisory brief: rustsec-2026-0284

Advisory: Double free in `Map::into_iter` and an uninitialized `Arc` in `SharedIncin::clear`
IDs: rustsec-2026-0284
Record: https://patchnext.com/advisories/rustsec-2026-0284 (revision 1, source checked 23 Oct 2026, 22:04 UTC)
Inventory: none attached. This brief comes from a public page and does not say whether any deployment is affected.
Severity: Unrated
Exploitation: no confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next confirms exploitation only from CISA KEV.
Vendor response: Vendor response not established. A vendor fix does not mean a deployment is fixed.

## Affected components
- crates.io lockfree: affected >= 0.0.0-0

## Suggested inspection (read-only)
- crates.io lockfree: check the installed version with your package manager.

## Supported action
No complete vendor fix is recorded. Follow the primary source's mitigation guidance and check this record again before closing anything.

## Required regression checks
- Run the test suite and a production build.
- Exercise the features that depend on lockfree.
- Repeat the inspection and confirm that only fixed versions remain installed.

## Rollback considerations
- Keep the previous lockfile and deployment artifact. Rolling back reinstates the vulnerable version, so apply any documented mitigation while you fix forward.

## Unresolved questions
- Which deployments run an affected version?
- Exploitation status can change. Check again before lowering the priority.
- Mark the work resolved only after the fixed version is verified in production.

## Sources
- Verified: https://osv.dev/vulnerability/RUSTSEC-2026-0284 (OSV record RUSTSEC-2026-0284 lists affected ranges: crates.io lockfree >=0.0.0-0)

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