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Ed25519 identity public keys permit universal signature forgery

GHSA-7j32-2mpw-c784

What to do

Vendor fix available. Upgrade each affected package to the fixed version on its release line (dcrypt-sign 2.0.0), redeploy, then verify what is actually installed.

This page has no inventory attached, so it cannot say whether you are affected. A vendor fix is not proof that your deployment is fixed.

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Affected packages

  • crates.io dcrypt-sign

    Affected
    >= 0.0.0-0, < 2.0.0
    Fixed in
    2.0.0

Sources

Severity and exploitation
Exploitation
No confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next marks exploitation only from CISA KEV.
CVSS
not scored
EPSS
No dated EPSS signal available.
Source description

As published by the source; long descriptions are shortened.

All published versions of `dcrypt-sign` before 2.0.0 accepted the Edwards identity as an Ed25519 public key. A signature with `R = B` and `S = 1` then verified for every message because the challenge term multiplied the identity. The implementation also admitted other noncanonical or small-order inputs. Consumers that accepted externally supplied dcrypt Ed25519 keys may therefore have accepted forged authorizations. Version 2.0.0 replaces the custom arithmetic with `ed25519-dalek`, uses strict verification, and rejects noncanonical, small-order, and non-torsion-free public keys and `R` values, as well as noncanonical `S >= L`. No wrapper around the affected verifier is recommended as a complete workaround. Upgrade to 2.0.0 or later, audit registered keys and trust stores, and review historical actions authorized with externally supplied keys.

Dates and revisions
Published by the source
Last modified by the source
Source last checked
  1. Revision 1 · created ·

    Published from osv record RUSTSEC-2026-0240

Agent brief

Preview the exact text before you copy it. Commands are read-only suggestions; review them before running anything.

# Patch Next advisory brief: GHSA-7j32-2mpw-c784

Advisory: Ed25519 identity public keys permit universal signature forgery
IDs: GHSA-7j32-2mpw-c784
Record: https://patchnext.com/advisories/rustsec-2026-0240 (revision 1, source checked 23 Oct 2026, 22:04 UTC)
Inventory: none attached. This brief comes from a public page and does not say whether any deployment is affected.
Severity: Unrated
Exploitation: no confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next confirms exploitation only from CISA KEV.
Vendor response: Vendor fix available; fixed versions by package: dcrypt-sign 2.0.0. A vendor fix does not mean a deployment is fixed.

## Affected components
- crates.io dcrypt-sign: affected >= 0.0.0-0, < 2.0.0; fixed in 2.0.0

## Suggested inspection (read-only)
- crates.io dcrypt-sign: check the installed version with your package manager.

## Supported action
Upgrade each affected component to a fixed version on its release line. For a transitive dependency, upgrade the parent package or add an override or constraint, then regenerate the lockfile. Redeploy every environment that ran an affected version.

## Required regression checks
- Run the test suite and a production build.
- Exercise the features that depend on dcrypt-sign.
- Repeat the inspection and confirm that only fixed versions remain installed.

## Rollback considerations
- Keep the previous lockfile and deployment artifact. Rolling back reinstates the vulnerable version, so apply any documented mitigation while you fix forward.

## Unresolved questions
- Which deployments run an affected version?
- Exploitation status can change. Check again before lowering the priority.
- Mark the work resolved only after the fixed version is verified in production.

## Sources
- Verified: https://osv.dev/vulnerability/RUSTSEC-2026-0240 (OSV record RUSTSEC-2026-0240 lists affected ranges: crates.io dcrypt-sign >=0.0.0-0 <2.0.0 (fixed))

Commands are suggestions: review each one before running it.

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