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High, CVSS 7.5

Relay authentication challenges can exhaust memory

What to do

Vendor fix available. Upgrade each affected package to the fixed version on its release line (nostr-relay-pool 0.44.3), redeploy, then verify what is actually installed.

This page has no inventory attached, so it cannot say whether you are affected. A vendor fix is not proof that your deployment is fixed.

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Affected packages

Sources

Severity and exploitation
Exploitation
No confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next marks exploitation only from CISA KEV.
CVSS
7.5 · CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
EPSS
No dated EPSS signal available.
Source description

As published by the source; long descriptions are shortened.

The SDK forwarded every NIP-42 `AUTH` challenge received from a relay through an unbounded command queue. Challenge handling can wait for an asynchronous signer or user interaction, so receiving challenges was substantially faster than completing the corresponding authentication work. A malicious relay could continuously send new challenges without authenticating or delivering valid events. Every value remained queued, causing memory use and pending signer operations to grow without a fixed limit until the client became unavailable. The issue does not allow the relay to forge a signature or learn the client's private key. The SDK now coalesces pending challenges through a latest-value channel. NIP-42 makes an earlier challenge invalid when the relay sends a new one, so replacing pending work preserves the only challenge that can still be answered while keeping memory use bounded.

Dates and revisions
Published by the source
Last modified by the source
Source last checked
  1. Revision 1 · created ·

    Published from osv record RUSTSEC-2026-0231

Agent brief

Preview the exact text before you copy it. Commands are read-only suggestions; review them before running anything.

# Patch Next advisory brief: rustsec-2026-0231

Advisory: Relay authentication challenges can exhaust memory
IDs: rustsec-2026-0231
Record: https://patchnext.com/advisories/rustsec-2026-0231 (revision 1, source checked 23 Oct 2026, 22:04 UTC)
Inventory: none attached. This brief comes from a public page and does not say whether any deployment is affected.
Severity: High (CVSS 7.5)
Exploitation: no confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next confirms exploitation only from CISA KEV.
Vendor response: Vendor fix available; fixed versions by package: nostr-relay-pool 0.44.3. A vendor fix does not mean a deployment is fixed.

## Affected components
- crates.io nostr-relay-pool: affected >= 0.0.0-0, < 0.44.3; fixed in 0.44.3

## Suggested inspection (read-only)
- crates.io nostr-relay-pool: check the installed version with your package manager.

## Supported action
Upgrade each affected component to a fixed version on its release line. For a transitive dependency, upgrade the parent package or add an override or constraint, then regenerate the lockfile. Redeploy every environment that ran an affected version.

## Required regression checks
- Run the test suite and a production build.
- Exercise the features that depend on nostr-relay-pool.
- Repeat the inspection and confirm that only fixed versions remain installed.

## Rollback considerations
- Keep the previous lockfile and deployment artifact. Rolling back reinstates the vulnerable version, so apply any documented mitigation while you fix forward.

## Unresolved questions
- Which deployments run an affected version?
- Exploitation status can change. Check again before lowering the priority.
- Mark the work resolved only after the fixed version is verified in production.

## Sources
- Verified: https://osv.dev/vulnerability/RUSTSEC-2026-0231 (OSV record RUSTSEC-2026-0231 lists affected ranges: crates.io nostr-relay-pool >=0.0.0-0 <0.44.3 (fixed))

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