NIP-44 v2 decryption permits resource exhaustion

Exploitation

No confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next marks exploitation only from CISA KEV.

CVSS

7.5 · CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H

EPSS

No dated EPSS signal available.

As published by the source; long descriptions are shortened.

The NIP-44 decryption entry point Base64-decoded the complete attacker-controlled payload before determining its version or enforcing any size limit. For v2 payloads, the decoded buffer was then authenticated with HMAC even when it was much larger than the maximum payload supported by the crate's current v2 codec. A malicious relay or event author could deliver an oversized value to an application that decrypts NIP-44 content. The value caused memory allocation and Base64 and HMAC work proportional to its size before authentication failed; knowledge of the conversation key was not required to consume those initial resources. Repeated payloads could exhaust memory or CPU and make the receiving application unavailable. The issue does not disclose plaintext or key material and does not bypass message authentication. Decryption now reads only the encoded version prefix first, derives the bound from the largest payload the current v2 encoder can emit, and rejects oversized encoded and…

Published by the source

1 Aug 2026, 12:00 UTC

Last modified by the source

2 Aug 2026, 18:00 UTC

Source last checked

23 Oct 2026, 22:04 UTC

1. Revision 1 · created · 24 Oct 2026

   Published from osv record RUSTSEC-2026-0227

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# Patch Next advisory brief: rustsec-2026-0227

Advisory: NIP-44 v2 decryption permits resource exhaustion
IDs: rustsec-2026-0227
Record: https://patchnext.com/advisories/rustsec-2026-0227 (revision 1, source checked 23 Oct 2026, 22:04 UTC)
Inventory: none attached. This brief comes from a public page and does not say whether any deployment is affected.
Severity: High (CVSS 7.5)
Exploitation: no confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next confirms exploitation only from CISA KEV.
Vendor response: Vendor fix available; fixed versions by package: nostr 0.44.7. A vendor fix does not mean a deployment is fixed.

## Affected components
- crates.io nostr: affected >= 0.0.0-0, < 0.44.7; fixed in 0.44.7

## Suggested inspection (read-only)
- crates.io nostr: check the installed version with your package manager.

## Supported action
Upgrade each affected component to a fixed version on its release line. For a transitive dependency, upgrade the parent package or add an override or constraint, then regenerate the lockfile. Redeploy every environment that ran an affected version.

## Required regression checks
- Run the test suite and a production build.
- Exercise the features that depend on nostr.
- Repeat the inspection and confirm that only fixed versions remain installed.

## Rollback considerations
- Keep the previous lockfile and deployment artifact. Rolling back reinstates the vulnerable version, so apply any documented mitigation while you fix forward.

## Unresolved questions
- Which deployments run an affected version?
- Exploitation status can change. Check again before lowering the priority.
- Mark the work resolved only after the fixed version is verified in production.

## Sources
- Verified: https://osv.dev/vulnerability/RUSTSEC-2026-0227 (OSV record RUSTSEC-2026-0227 lists affected ranges: crates.io nostr >=0.0.0-0 <0.44.7 (fixed))

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