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Medium, CVSS 5.5

Debug output exposes NIP-46 and NIP-60 credentials

What to do

Vendor fix available. Upgrade each affected package to the fixed version on its release line (nostr 0.44.7), redeploy, then verify what is actually installed.

This page has no inventory attached, so it cannot say whether you are affected. A vendor fix is not proof that your deployment is fixed.

Affected packages

  • crates.io nostr

    Affected
    >= 0.0.0-0, < 0.44.7
    Fixed in
    0.44.7

Sources

Severity and exploitation
Exploitation
No confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next marks exploitation only from CISA KEV.
CVSS
5.5 · CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N
EPSS
No dated EPSS signal available.
Source description

As published by the source; long descriptions are shortened.

Several NIP-46 and NIP-60 types used derived `Debug` implementations even though their fields contained credentials or decrypted application data. Formatting these values exposed NIP-46 connection secrets and request parameters, as well as NIP-60 private keys, Cashu bearer proofs, and quote capability identifiers. Applications commonly include `Debug` output in diagnostic logs, tracing spans, or error reports. Anyone able to read those outputs could recover the disclosed credentials and, depending on the value, impersonate a signer connection or spend wallet tokens. The issue does not expose data unless an affected value is formatted and the resulting output is made accessible. The affected types now use custom `Debug` implementations that preserve variant and non-sensitive structural information while replacing credentials, bearer values, and plaintext fields with redaction markers. Serialization and protocol behavior are unchanged.

Dates and revisions
Published by the source
Last modified by the source
Source last checked
  1. Revision 1 · created ·

    Published from osv record RUSTSEC-2026-0225

Agent brief

Preview the exact text before you copy it. Commands are read-only suggestions; review them before running anything.

# Patch Next advisory brief: rustsec-2026-0225

Advisory: Debug output exposes NIP-46 and NIP-60 credentials
IDs: rustsec-2026-0225
Record: https://patchnext.com/advisories/rustsec-2026-0225 (revision 1, source checked 23 Oct 2026, 22:04 UTC)
Inventory: none attached. This brief comes from a public page and does not say whether any deployment is affected.
Severity: Medium (CVSS 5.5)
Exploitation: no confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next confirms exploitation only from CISA KEV.
Vendor response: Vendor fix available; fixed versions by package: nostr 0.44.7. A vendor fix does not mean a deployment is fixed.

## Affected components
- crates.io nostr: affected >= 0.0.0-0, < 0.44.7; fixed in 0.44.7

## Suggested inspection (read-only)
- crates.io nostr: check the installed version with your package manager.

## Supported action
Upgrade each affected component to a fixed version on its release line. For a transitive dependency, upgrade the parent package or add an override or constraint, then regenerate the lockfile. Redeploy every environment that ran an affected version.

## Required regression checks
- Run the test suite and a production build.
- Exercise the features that depend on nostr.
- Repeat the inspection and confirm that only fixed versions remain installed.

## Rollback considerations
- Keep the previous lockfile and deployment artifact. Rolling back reinstates the vulnerable version, so apply any documented mitigation while you fix forward.

## Unresolved questions
- Which deployments run an affected version?
- Exploitation status can change. Check again before lowering the priority.
- Mark the work resolved only after the fixed version is verified in production.

## Sources
- Verified: https://osv.dev/vulnerability/RUSTSEC-2026-0225 (OSV record RUSTSEC-2026-0225 lists affected ranges: crates.io nostr >=0.0.0-0 <0.44.7 (fixed))

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