Remote Denial of Service via malformed NIP-04 IV

Exploitation

No confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next marks exploitation only from CISA KEV.

CVSS

7.5 · CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H

EPSS

No dated EPSS signal available.

As published by the source; long descriptions are shortened.

The `nostr` crate did not validate the length of the initialization vector decoded from the `?iv=` portion of a NIP-04 encrypted message. The decoded IV was converted from a byte slice to the 16-byte AES-CBC IV type using a conversion that asserts the slice length. As a result, an IV whose decoded length was not exactly 16 bytes caused a panic before ciphertext decryption. For example, `?iv=AAAA` decodes to a three-byte IV and triggers the panic. Applications that decrypt untrusted NIP-04 content are affected. The issue is also reachable through NIP-47 (Nostr Wallet Connect), where response and notification events from a malicious or compromised wallet service are passed to NIP-04 decryption. If the panic is not isolated, a crafted event can terminate the application or disrupt message processing, causing a denial of service. The issue does not affect confidentiality or integrity. The flaw was corrected by converting the decoded IV to `[u8; 16]` using a checked conversion. Invalid IV…

Published by the source

26 Jul 2026, 12:00 UTC

Last modified by the source

1 Aug 2026, 11:45 UTC

Source last checked

23 Oct 2026, 22:04 UTC

1. Revision 1 · created · 24 Oct 2026

   Published from osv record RUSTSEC-2026-0219

Preview the exact text before you copy it. Commands are read-only suggestions; review them before running anything.

# Patch Next advisory brief: GHSA-xg7c-246g-6qpv

Advisory: Remote Denial of Service via malformed NIP-04 IV
IDs: GHSA-xg7c-246g-6qpv
Record: https://patchnext.com/advisories/rustsec-2026-0219 (revision 1, source checked 23 Oct 2026, 22:04 UTC)
Inventory: none attached. This brief comes from a public page and does not say whether any deployment is affected.
Severity: High (CVSS 7.5)
Exploitation: no confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next confirms exploitation only from CISA KEV.
Vendor response: Vendor fix available; fixed versions by package: nostr 0.45.0-alpha.6, 0.44.6. A vendor fix does not mean a deployment is fixed.

## Affected components
- crates.io nostr: affected >= 0.0.0-0, < 0.44.6; >= 0.45.0-alpha.1, < 0.45.0-alpha.6; fixed in 0.44.6, 0.45.0-alpha.6

## Suggested inspection (read-only)
- crates.io nostr: check the installed version with your package manager.

## Supported action
Upgrade each affected component to a fixed version on its release line. For a transitive dependency, upgrade the parent package or add an override or constraint, then regenerate the lockfile. Redeploy every environment that ran an affected version.

## Required regression checks
- Run the test suite and a production build.
- Exercise the features that depend on nostr.
- Repeat the inspection and confirm that only fixed versions remain installed.

## Rollback considerations
- Keep the previous lockfile and deployment artifact. Rolling back reinstates the vulnerable version, so apply any documented mitigation while you fix forward.

## Unresolved questions
- Which deployments run an affected version?
- Exploitation status can change. Check again before lowering the priority.
- Mark the work resolved only after the fixed version is verified in production.

## Sources
- Verified: https://osv.dev/vulnerability/RUSTSEC-2026-0219 (OSV record RUSTSEC-2026-0219 lists affected ranges: crates.io nostr >=0.0.0-0 =0.45.0-alpha.1 <0.45.0-alpha.6 (fixed))

Commands are suggestions: review each one before running it.