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Unratedamended

Malicious code in litellm (PyPI)

What to do

Vendor response not established. Follow the primary source's mitigation guidance and check back for a fix.

This page has no inventory attached, so it cannot say whether you are affected. A vendor fix is not proof that your deployment is fixed.

Affected packages

  • PyPI litellm

    Affected
    >= 1.82.7, <= 1.82.7>= 1.82.8, <= 1.82.8>= 1.107.0, <= 1.107.0
    Fixed in
    no fixed version recorded

Sources

Severity and exploitation
Exploitation
No confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next marks exploitation only from CISA KEV.
CVSS
not scored
EPSS
No dated EPSS signal available.
Source description

As published by the source; long descriptions are shortened.

litellm 1.107.0, uploaded to PyPI on 2026-10-21 between 11:39 and 11:40 UTC, contains a credential stealer and a remote code execution backdoor that are not in the upstream source (the v1.107.0 git tag of BerriAI/litellm does not contain them): they were injected at build or upload time. Every wheel ships three extra files under litellm-1.107.0.data/purelib/, which pip installs at the site-packages root, so the payload is triggered at every Python interpreter start, without importing litellm. - cook.pth contains `import cook`. - cook.py runs `exec(zlib.decompress(base64.b64decode(...)))`, an info stealer (self-named "privcollect") that collects browser passwords and history, SSH keys, shell history, AWS/GCP/Azure credentials and cloud instance metadata (169.254.169.254, 169.254.170.2), Kubernetes, Docker, Vault and CI secrets, AI developer tool configurations (~/.cursor, ~/.claude, ~/.kiro, Windsurf), GPG and TLS private keys, .npmrc, .pypirc, .git-credentials and environment…

Dates and revisions
Published by the source
Last modified by the source
Source last checked
  1. Revision 2 · amended ·

    Amended from osv record MAL-2026-2144

  2. Revision 1 · created ·

    Published from osv record PYSEC-2026-2

Agent brief

Preview the exact text before you copy it. Commands are read-only suggestions; review them before running anything.

# Patch Next advisory brief: pysec-2026-2

Advisory: Malicious code in litellm (PyPI)
IDs: pysec-2026-2
Record: https://patchnext.com/advisories/pysec-2026-2 (revision 2, source checked 30 Oct 2026, 06:40 UTC)
Inventory: none attached. This brief comes from a public page and does not say whether any deployment is affected.
Severity: Unrated
Exploitation: no confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next confirms exploitation only from CISA KEV.
Vendor response: Vendor response not established. A vendor fix does not mean a deployment is fixed.

## Affected components
- PyPI litellm: affected >= 1.82.7, <= 1.82.7; >= 1.82.8, <= 1.82.8; >= 1.107.0, <= 1.107.0

## Suggested inspection (read-only)
- `python -m pip show litellm`: prints the installed version. Run with the environment that serves production active.

## Supported action
No complete vendor fix is recorded. Follow the primary source's mitigation guidance and check this record again before closing anything.

## Required regression checks
- Run the test suite and a production build.
- Exercise the features that depend on litellm.
- Repeat the inspection and confirm that only fixed versions remain installed.

## Rollback considerations
- Keep the previous lockfile and deployment artifact. Rolling back reinstates the vulnerable version, so apply any documented mitigation while you fix forward.

## Unresolved questions
- Which deployments run an affected version?
- Exploitation status can change. Check again before lowering the priority.
- Mark the work resolved only after the fixed version is verified in production.

## Sources
- Verified: https://osv.dev/vulnerability/PYSEC-2026-2 (OSV record PYSEC-2026-2 lists affected ranges: PyPI litellm >=1.82.7 <=1.82.8)
- Verified: https://osv.dev/vulnerability/MAL-2026-2144 (OSV record MAL-2026-2144 lists affected ranges: PyPI litellm >=1.82.7 =1.82.8 =1.107.0 <=1.107.0)

Commands are suggestions: review each one before running it.

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