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Malicious code in js-price-client-node (npm)

GHSA-p53q-9fj9-cc6m

What to do

Vendor response not established. Follow the primary source's mitigation guidance and check back for a fix.

This page has no inventory attached, so it cannot say whether you are affected. A vendor fix is not proof that your deployment is fixed.

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Affected packages

  • npm js-price-client-node

    Affected
    every version
    Fixed in
    no fixed version recorded

Sources

Severity and exploitation
Exploitation
No confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next marks exploitation only from CISA KEV.
CVSS
not scored
EPSS
No dated EPSS signal available.
Source description

As published by the source; long descriptions are shortened.

--- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_

Source: amazon-inspector (763a44df6481ee1948ff9fda0b3997a93001acb138b7bbcba1787c3f2f8699f2) On `npm install`, the package's `postinstall` script invokes `prices()` in `dist/index.js`, which resolves the consumer's project root via `process.env.INIT_CWD?? process.cwd()`, reads `.env` with `fs.readFileSync`, parses it with `dotenv`, and POSTs the parsed key/value pairs as JSON to a hardcoded remote URL. The destination URL is concealed: it is base58-encoded and split into two halves, `ENCODED_URL_PART_A` in `dist/index.js` and `ENCODED_URL_PART_B` imported from `dist/cli.js`, then reassembled and decoded at runtime by `decodeBase58Url`. The upload promise is wrapped in `.catch(() => {})` in `dist/postinstall.js` so failures never surface during install. `prices()` also honors an undocumented `SKIP_INT_NODE_UPLOAD` env var and returns plausible-looking success objects (including a fabricated `responsive: 0.99897` field) to…

Dates and revisions
Published by the source
Last modified by the source
Source last checked
  1. Revision 1 · created ·

    Published from osv record MAL-2026-6503

Agent brief

Preview the exact text before you copy it. Commands are read-only suggestions; review them before running anything.

# Patch Next advisory brief: GHSA-p53q-9fj9-cc6m

Advisory: Malicious code in js-price-client-node (npm)
IDs: GHSA-p53q-9fj9-cc6m
Record: https://patchnext.com/advisories/mal-2026-6503 (revision 1, source checked 10 Nov 2026, 06:00 UTC)
Inventory: none attached. This brief comes from a public page and does not say whether any deployment is affected.
Severity: Unrated
Exploitation: no confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next confirms exploitation only from CISA KEV.
Vendor response: Vendor response not established. A vendor fix does not mean a deployment is fixed.

## Affected components
- npm js-price-client-node: affected every version

## Suggested inspection (read-only)
- `npm ls js-price-client-node --all`: lists every installed copy and version, including transitive ones. Run in the project root after `npm ci`.

## Supported action
No complete vendor fix is recorded. Follow the primary source's mitigation guidance and check this record again before closing anything.

## Required regression checks
- Run the test suite and a production build.
- Exercise the features that depend on js-price-client-node.
- Repeat the inspection and confirm that only fixed versions remain installed.

## Rollback considerations
- Keep the previous lockfile and deployment artifact. Rolling back reinstates the vulnerable version, so apply any documented mitigation while you fix forward.

## Unresolved questions
- Which deployments run an affected version?
- Exploitation status can change. Check again before lowering the priority.
- Mark the work resolved only after the fixed version is verified in production.

## Sources
- Verified: https://osv.dev/vulnerability/MAL-2026-6503 (OSV record MAL-2026-6503 lists affected ranges: npm js-price-client-node >=0)

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