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Malicious code in self-certificate (npm)

GHSA-6p47-hr8r-4wq6

What to do

Vendor response not established. Follow the primary source's mitigation guidance and check back for a fix.

This page has no inventory attached, so it cannot say whether you are affected. A vendor fix is not proof that your deployment is fixed.

Affected packages

  • npm self-certificate

    Affected
    every version
    Fixed in
    no fixed version recorded

Sources

Severity and exploitation
Exploitation
No confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next marks exploitation only from CISA KEV.
CVSS
not scored
EPSS
No dated EPSS signal available.
Source description

As published by the source; long descriptions are shortened.

--- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_

Source: amazon-inspector (ab587fcd5a0b45e17454fc742007b8b597a0aec49b443d8a5a087ba910ea4a40) The package presents itself as a self-signed certificate generator, but its public generateCertificates() API path loads sample/cert.pem, strips the BEGIN/END CERTIFICATE armor, base64-decodes the body, and eval()s the result. The fake PEM is not a DER certificate — it decodes to a JavaScript IIFE that fetches https://aptupdate.org/settings/privacy.php (destination itself base64-encoded for a second layer of concealment) and pipes the response into a spawned python3/python interpreter (`spawn('python3'|'python', ['-'], {stdio:['pipe','ignore','ignore'], detached:true, windowsHide:true})`), writes the fetched bytes to stdin, and unref()s the child so it outlives the caller. The combination of cover-story file extension, double-base64-wrapped C2 URL, detached/hidden/stdio-ignored Python execution, and eval of a payload disguised as a…

Dates and revisions
Published by the source
Last modified by the source
Source last checked
  1. Revision 1 · created ·

    Published from osv record MAL-2026-5644

Agent brief

Preview the exact text before you copy it. Commands are read-only suggestions; review them before running anything.

# Patch Next advisory brief: GHSA-6p47-hr8r-4wq6

Advisory: Malicious code in self-certificate (npm)
IDs: GHSA-6p47-hr8r-4wq6
Record: https://patchnext.com/advisories/mal-2026-5644 (revision 1, source checked 13 Nov 2026, 06:10 UTC)
Inventory: none attached. This brief comes from a public page and does not say whether any deployment is affected.
Severity: Unrated
Exploitation: no confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next confirms exploitation only from CISA KEV.
Vendor response: Vendor response not established. A vendor fix does not mean a deployment is fixed.

## Affected components
- npm self-certificate: affected every version

## Suggested inspection (read-only)
- `npm ls self-certificate --all`: lists every installed copy and version, including transitive ones. Run in the project root after `npm ci`.

## Supported action
No complete vendor fix is recorded. Follow the primary source's mitigation guidance and check this record again before closing anything.

## Required regression checks
- Run the test suite and a production build.
- Exercise the features that depend on self-certificate.
- Repeat the inspection and confirm that only fixed versions remain installed.

## Rollback considerations
- Keep the previous lockfile and deployment artifact. Rolling back reinstates the vulnerable version, so apply any documented mitigation while you fix forward.

## Unresolved questions
- Which deployments run an affected version?
- Exploitation status can change. Check again before lowering the priority.
- Mark the work resolved only after the fixed version is verified in production.

## Sources
- Verified: https://osv.dev/vulnerability/MAL-2026-5644 (OSV record MAL-2026-5644 lists affected ranges: npm self-certificate >=0)

Commands are suggestions: review each one before running it.

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