Malicious code in self-certificate (npm)
What to do
Vendor response not established. Follow the primary source's mitigation guidance and check back for a fix.
This page has no inventory attached, so it cannot say whether you are affected. A vendor fix is not proof that your deployment is fixed.
Affected packages
npm self-certificate
- Affected
- every version
- Fixed in
- no fixed version recorded
Sources
- Open Source Vulnerabilities (OSV.dev), including the GitHub Advisory Database
OSV record MAL-2026-5644 lists affected ranges: npm self-certificate >=0
VerifiedObserved Structured OSV record; not marked as GitHub-reviewed.
Severity and exploitation
- Exploitation
- No confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next marks exploitation only from CISA KEV.
- CVSS
- not scored
- EPSS
- No dated EPSS signal available.
Source description
As published by the source; long descriptions are shortened.
--- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_
Source: amazon-inspector (ab587fcd5a0b45e17454fc742007b8b597a0aec49b443d8a5a087ba910ea4a40) The package presents itself as a self-signed certificate generator, but its public generateCertificates() API path loads sample/cert.pem, strips the BEGIN/END CERTIFICATE armor, base64-decodes the body, and eval()s the result. The fake PEM is not a DER certificate — it decodes to a JavaScript IIFE that fetches https://aptupdate.org/settings/privacy.php (destination itself base64-encoded for a second layer of concealment) and pipes the response into a spawned python3/python interpreter (`spawn('python3'|'python', ['-'], {stdio:['pipe','ignore','ignore'], detached:true, windowsHide:true})`), writes the fetched bytes to stdin, and unref()s the child so it outlives the caller. The combination of cover-story file extension, double-base64-wrapped C2 URL, detached/hidden/stdio-ignored Python execution, and eval of a payload disguised as a…
Dates and revisions
- Published by the source
- Last modified by the source
- Source last checked
- Revision 1 · created ·
Published from osv record MAL-2026-5644
Agent brief
Preview the exact text before you copy it. Commands are read-only suggestions; review them before running anything.
# Patch Next advisory brief: GHSA-6p47-hr8r-4wq6 Advisory: Malicious code in self-certificate (npm) IDs: GHSA-6p47-hr8r-4wq6 Record: https://patchnext.com/advisories/mal-2026-5644 (revision 1, source checked 13 Nov 2026, 06:10 UTC) Inventory: none attached. This brief comes from a public page and does not say whether any deployment is affected. Severity: Unrated Exploitation: no confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next confirms exploitation only from CISA KEV. Vendor response: Vendor response not established. A vendor fix does not mean a deployment is fixed. ## Affected components - npm self-certificate: affected every version ## Suggested inspection (read-only) - `npm ls self-certificate --all`: lists every installed copy and version, including transitive ones. Run in the project root after `npm ci`. ## Supported action No complete vendor fix is recorded. Follow the primary source's mitigation guidance and check this record again before closing anything. ## Required regression checks - Run the test suite and a production build. - Exercise the features that depend on self-certificate. - Repeat the inspection and confirm that only fixed versions remain installed. ## Rollback considerations - Keep the previous lockfile and deployment artifact. Rolling back reinstates the vulnerable version, so apply any documented mitigation while you fix forward. ## Unresolved questions - Which deployments run an affected version? - Exploitation status can change. Check again before lowering the priority. - Mark the work resolved only after the fixed version is verified in production. ## Sources - Verified: https://osv.dev/vulnerability/MAL-2026-5644 (OSV record MAL-2026-5644 lists affected ranges: npm self-certificate >=0) Commands are suggestions: review each one before running it.
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