Malicious code in @testsecuiitytestme/cache-helper (npm)
What to do
Vendor response not established. Follow the primary source's mitigation guidance and check back for a fix.
This page has no inventory attached, so it cannot say whether you are affected. A vendor fix is not proof that your deployment is fixed.
Affected packages
npm @testsecuiitytestme/cache-helper
- Affected
- >= 1.0.1, <= 1.0.1>= 1.0.2, <= 1.0.2>= 1.0.3, <= 1.0.3>= 1.0.4, <= 1.0.4>= 1.0.5, <= 1.0.5>= 1.0.6, <= 1.0.6>= 1.0.7, <= 1.0.7
- Fixed in
- no fixed version recorded
Sources
- Open Source Vulnerabilities (OSV.dev), including the GitHub Advisory Database
OSV record MAL-2026-18358 lists affected ranges: npm @testsecuiitytestme/cache-helper >=1.0.1 =1.0.2 =1.0.3 <=1.0.3
VerifiedObserved Structured OSV record; not marked as GitHub-reviewed.
- Open Source Vulnerabilities (OSV.dev), including the GitHub Advisory Database
OSV record MAL-2026-18358 lists affected ranges: npm @testsecuiitytestme/cache-helper >=1.0.1 =1.0.2 =1.0.3 =1.0.4 =1.0.5 =1.0.6 =1.0.7 <=1.0.7
VerifiedObserved Structured OSV record; not marked as GitHub-reviewed.
Severity and exploitation
- Exploitation
- No confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next marks exploitation only from CISA KEV.
- CVSS
- not scored
- EPSS
- No dated EPSS signal available.
Source description
As published by the source; long descriptions are shortened.
This package installs a credential stealer and self-spreading worm. On a developer machine (it exits under CI, in containers and under a debugger), the install script loads a prebuilt native addon that decodes and runs a hidden, obfuscated Bun program. That program collects npm, GitHub, GitLab, PyPI, RubyGems, JFrog, Docker and cloud (AWS, GCP, Azure) credentials, HashiCorp Vault and Kubernetes secrets, SSH keys, .git-credentials and .env files, browser logins, the macOS keychain, 1Password and Bitwarden, and uses stolen publishing tokens to spread: it publishes to npm, PyPI and RubyGems, injects GitHub workflows and GitLab CI templates, and writes hooks into AI coding assistant configuration. Anyone who installed any version should treat every credential reachable from that machine as exposed: rotate npm, GitHub and cloud tokens, check their own packages for unexpected releases, and check repositories for unexpected workflow changes. @testsecuiitytestme/cache-helper is the only…
Dates and revisions
- Published by the source
- Last modified by the source
- Source last checked
- Revision 2 · amended ·
Amended from osv record MAL-2026-18358
- Revision 1 · created ·
Published from osv record MAL-2026-18358
Agent brief
Preview the exact text before you copy it. Commands are read-only suggestions; review them before running anything.
# Patch Next advisory brief: mal-2026-18358 Advisory: Malicious code in @testsecuiitytestme/cache-helper (npm) IDs: mal-2026-18358 Record: https://patchnext.com/advisories/mal-2026-18358 (revision 2, source checked 30 Oct 2026, 06:15 UTC) Inventory: none attached. This brief comes from a public page and does not say whether any deployment is affected. Severity: Unrated Exploitation: no confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next confirms exploitation only from CISA KEV. Vendor response: Vendor response not established. A vendor fix does not mean a deployment is fixed. ## Affected components - npm @testsecuiitytestme/cache-helper: affected >= 1.0.1, <= 1.0.1; >= 1.0.2, <= 1.0.2; >= 1.0.3, <= 1.0.3; >= 1.0.4, <= 1.0.4; >= 1.0.5, <= 1.0.5; >= 1.0.6, <= 1.0.6; >= 1.0.7, <= 1.0.7 ## Suggested inspection (read-only) - `npm ls @testsecuiitytestme/cache-helper --all`: lists every installed copy and version, including transitive ones. Run in the project root after `npm ci`. ## Supported action No complete vendor fix is recorded. Follow the primary source's mitigation guidance and check this record again before closing anything. ## Required regression checks - Run the test suite and a production build. - Exercise the features that depend on @testsecuiitytestme/cache-helper. - Repeat the inspection and confirm that only fixed versions remain installed. ## Rollback considerations - Keep the previous lockfile and deployment artifact. Rolling back reinstates the vulnerable version, so apply any documented mitigation while you fix forward. ## Unresolved questions - Which deployments run an affected version? - Exploitation status can change. Check again before lowering the priority. - Mark the work resolved only after the fixed version is verified in production. ## Sources - Verified: https://osv.dev/vulnerability/MAL-2026-18358 (OSV record MAL-2026-18358 lists affected ranges: npm @testsecuiitytestme/cache-helper >=1.0.1 =1.0.2 =1.0.3 <=1.0.3) - Verified: https://osv.dev/vulnerability/MAL-2026-18358 (OSV record MAL-2026-18358 lists affected ranges: npm @testsecuiitytestme/cache-helper >=1.0.1 =1.0.2 =1.0.3 =1.0.4 =1.0.5 =1.0.6 =1.0.7 <=1.0.7) Commands are suggestions: review each one before running it.
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