Malicious code in @iobandamwer/cache-helper (npm)
What to do
Vendor response not established. Follow the primary source's mitigation guidance and check back for a fix.
This page has no inventory attached, so it cannot say whether you are affected. A vendor fix is not proof that your deployment is fixed.
Affected packages
npm @iobandamwer/cache-helper
- Affected
- >= 1.1.3, <= 1.1.3>= 1.1.2, <= 1.1.2>= 1.1.1, <= 1.1.1>= 1.1.0, <= 1.1.0>= 1.0.9, <= 1.0.9>= 1.0.8, <= 1.0.8>= 1.0.7, <= 1.0.7>= 1.0.6, <= 1.0.6>= 1.0.5, <= 1.0.5>= 1.0.4, <= 1.0.4>= 1.0.3, <= 1.0.3>= 1.0.2, <= 1.0.2>= 0.0.0-stage, <= 0.0.0-stage
- Fixed in
- no fixed version recorded
Sources
- Open Source Vulnerabilities (OSV.dev), including the GitHub Advisory Database
OSV record MAL-2026-18329 lists affected ranges: npm @iobandamwer/cache-helper >=1.1.3 =1.1.2 =1.1.1 =1.1.0 =1.0.9 =1.0.8 =1.0.7 =1.0.6 =1.0.5 =1.0.4 =1.0.3 =1.0.2 =0.0.0-stage <=0.0.0-stage
VerifiedObserved Structured OSV record; not marked as GitHub-reviewed.
Severity and exploitation
- Exploitation
- No confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next marks exploitation only from CISA KEV.
- CVSS
- not scored
- EPSS
- No dated EPSS signal available.
Source description
As published by the source; long descriptions are shortened.
--- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_
Source: amazon-inspector (b0a88993bf967d1bbbc61cb5f43b4d9af5d9ef74b920e70d828b4a52bf880979) The package advertises itself as 'Cache utilities' but ships no source, no binding.gyp, and no build configuration — only two prebuilt native addons (addon.node ELF for Linux, addon_win.node PE for Windows) and a 4,164,844-byte opaque, high-entropy file named.napi_cache with no readable strings and no magic header. The package.json postinstall hook runs `node -e "try{require(process.platform==='win32'?'./addon_win.node':'./addon.node').init()}catch(e){}"`, loading the platform-specific native binary and invoking init() on every install, with the error swallowed to suppress install-time noise. The Linux addon contains the format string '%s/.napi_cache' alongside fopen64/fread, references a '/tmp/.%u' staging path, and uses fork, setsid, execlp, chmod and _exit primitives — the shape of a drop-and-detach loader that reads the…
Dates and revisions
- Published by the source
- Last modified by the source
- Source last checked
- Revision 2 · amended ·
Amended from osv record MAL-2026-18329
- Revision 1 · created ·
Published from osv record MAL-2026-18329
Agent brief
Preview the exact text before you copy it. Commands are read-only suggestions; review them before running anything.
# Patch Next advisory brief: GHSA-j83w-xhgf-7m58 Advisory: Malicious code in @iobandamwer/cache-helper (npm) IDs: GHSA-j83w-xhgf-7m58 Record: https://patchnext.com/advisories/mal-2026-18329 (revision 2, source checked 30 Oct 2026, 06:15 UTC) Inventory: none attached. This brief comes from a public page and does not say whether any deployment is affected. Severity: Unrated Exploitation: no confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next confirms exploitation only from CISA KEV. Vendor response: Vendor response not established. A vendor fix does not mean a deployment is fixed. ## Affected components - npm @iobandamwer/cache-helper: affected >= 1.1.3, <= 1.1.3; >= 1.1.2, <= 1.1.2; >= 1.1.1, <= 1.1.1; >= 1.1.0, <= 1.1.0; >= 1.0.9, <= 1.0.9; >= 1.0.8, <= 1.0.8; >= 1.0.7, <= 1.0.7; >= 1.0.6, <= 1.0.6; >= 1.0.5, <= 1.0.5; >= 1.0.4, <= 1.0.4; >= 1.0.3, <= 1.0.3; >= 1.0.2, <= 1.0.2; >= 0.0.0-stage, <= 0.0.0-stage ## Suggested inspection (read-only) - `npm ls @iobandamwer/cache-helper --all`: lists every installed copy and version, including transitive ones. Run in the project root after `npm ci`. ## Supported action No complete vendor fix is recorded. Follow the primary source's mitigation guidance and check this record again before closing anything. ## Required regression checks - Run the test suite and a production build. - Exercise the features that depend on @iobandamwer/cache-helper. - Repeat the inspection and confirm that only fixed versions remain installed. ## Rollback considerations - Keep the previous lockfile and deployment artifact. Rolling back reinstates the vulnerable version, so apply any documented mitigation while you fix forward. ## Unresolved questions - Which deployments run an affected version? - Exploitation status can change. Check again before lowering the priority. - Mark the work resolved only after the fixed version is verified in production. ## Sources - Verified: https://osv.dev/vulnerability/MAL-2026-18329 (OSV record MAL-2026-18329 lists affected ranges: npm @iobandamwer/cache-helper >=1.1.3 =1.1.2 =1.1.1 =1.1.0 =1.0.9 =1.0.8 =1.0.7 =1.0.6 =1.0.5 =1.0.4 =1.0.3 =1.0.2 =0.0.0-stage <=0.0.0-stage) Commands are suggestions: review each one before running it.
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