Malicious code in publish-poc-base (npm)
What to do
Vendor response not established. Follow the primary source's mitigation guidance and check back for a fix.
This page has no inventory attached, so it cannot say whether you are affected. A vendor fix is not proof that your deployment is fixed.
Affected packages
npm publish-poc-base
- Affected
- >= 1.0.7, <= 1.0.7
- Fixed in
- no fixed version recorded
Sources
- Open Source Vulnerabilities (OSV.dev), including the GitHub Advisory Database
OSV record MAL-2026-18323 lists affected ranges: npm publish-poc-base >=1.0.7 <=1.0.7
VerifiedObserved Structured OSV record; not marked as GitHub-reviewed.
Severity and exploitation
- Exploitation
- No confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next marks exploitation only from CISA KEV.
- CVSS
- not scored
- EPSS
- No dated EPSS signal available.
Source description
As published by the source; long descriptions are shortened.
--- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_
Source: amazon-inspector (9bf2f71038e46898cc03f9bf5081547bb6d725e6a480ef22b80f4dc259c721d9) On install, the postinstall script in package.json reads the first line of../../README.md from the installer's parent workspace, creates a mktemp directory, writes a generated package.json named publish-poc-found- using that README content as its description, and writes an.npmrc containing a hardcoded npm registry _authToken (prefix npm_DLcrGeNT…) pointing at //registry.npmjs.org/. The staged directory is removed with rm -rf before any publish or network call fires, so this version does not itself execute the publish step, but the shipped token is distributed in cleartext to every installer and the staging logic is a working template for auto-publishing packages under the token owner's identity using data harvested from the installer's workspace. The combination of a live third-party-usable publish credential distributed to all…
Dates and revisions
- Published by the source
- Last modified by the source
- Source last checked
- Revision 1 · created ·
Published from osv record MAL-2026-18323
Agent brief
Preview the exact text before you copy it. Commands are read-only suggestions; review them before running anything.
# Patch Next advisory brief: mal-2026-18323 Advisory: Malicious code in publish-poc-base (npm) IDs: mal-2026-18323 Record: https://patchnext.com/advisories/mal-2026-18323 (revision 1, source checked 26 Oct 2026, 12:40 UTC) Inventory: none attached. This brief comes from a public page and does not say whether any deployment is affected. Severity: Unrated Exploitation: no confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next confirms exploitation only from CISA KEV. Vendor response: Vendor response not established. A vendor fix does not mean a deployment is fixed. ## Affected components - npm publish-poc-base: affected >= 1.0.7, <= 1.0.7 ## Suggested inspection (read-only) - `npm ls publish-poc-base --all`: lists every installed copy and version, including transitive ones. Run in the project root after `npm ci`. ## Supported action No complete vendor fix is recorded. Follow the primary source's mitigation guidance and check this record again before closing anything. ## Required regression checks - Run the test suite and a production build. - Exercise the features that depend on publish-poc-base. - Repeat the inspection and confirm that only fixed versions remain installed. ## Rollback considerations - Keep the previous lockfile and deployment artifact. Rolling back reinstates the vulnerable version, so apply any documented mitigation while you fix forward. ## Unresolved questions - Which deployments run an affected version? - Exploitation status can change. Check again before lowering the priority. - Mark the work resolved only after the fixed version is verified in production. ## Sources - Verified: https://osv.dev/vulnerability/MAL-2026-18323 (OSV record MAL-2026-18323 lists affected ranges: npm publish-poc-base >=1.0.7 <=1.0.7) Commands are suggestions: review each one before running it.
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