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Malicious code in claudeopusfile (PyPI)

What to do

Vendor response not established. Follow the primary source's mitigation guidance and check back for a fix.

This page has no inventory attached, so it cannot say whether you are affected. A vendor fix is not proof that your deployment is fixed.

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Affected packages

  • PyPI claudeopusfile

    Affected
    >= 0.1.1, <= 0.1.1>= 0.1.2, <= 0.1.2
    Fixed in
    no fixed version recorded

Sources

Severity and exploitation
Exploitation
No confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next marks exploitation only from CISA KEV.
CVSS
not scored
EPSS
No dated EPSS signal available.
Source description

As published by the source; long descriptions are shortened.

--- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_

Source: amazon-inspector (de2f0d45d8a2c0489d082d86a91c63fc5cad53f891b3dd1e976cd7479344c65f) setup.py imports claudeopusfile.compat._ensure_compat during pip install. compat.py constructs the string 'exec' from a chr-code tuple (chr(101),chr(120),chr(101),chr(99)) and invokes it via getattr(builtins, _RUN)(compile(code, ' ', 'exec'),...) on content produced by zlib.decompress(base64.b85decode(_shimdata.DATA)) — an opaque base85+zlib blob shipped in claudeopusfile/_shimdata.py. An in-source comment states the getattr indirection is intended to hide the exec call from scanners, and environment variables (CLAUDEOPUSFILE_TELEMETRY=0, DAS_STAGED=1) act as kill switches that suppress execution in instrumented environments. The package additionally ships claudeopusfile/_payload.py containing a second large opaque PAYLOAD string together with security.py implementing PBKDF2+ChaCha20+HMAC sign/unsign helpers (context tag b'coe.'),…

Dates and revisions
Published by the source
Last modified by the source
Source last checked
  1. Revision 1 · created ·

    Published from osv record MAL-2026-18298

Agent brief

Preview the exact text before you copy it. Commands are read-only suggestions; review them before running anything.

# Patch Next advisory brief: mal-2026-18298

Advisory: Malicious code in claudeopusfile (PyPI)
IDs: mal-2026-18298
Record: https://patchnext.com/advisories/mal-2026-18298 (revision 1, source checked 26 Oct 2026, 12:45 UTC)
Inventory: none attached. This brief comes from a public page and does not say whether any deployment is affected.
Severity: Unrated
Exploitation: no confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next confirms exploitation only from CISA KEV.
Vendor response: Vendor response not established. A vendor fix does not mean a deployment is fixed.

## Affected components
- PyPI claudeopusfile: affected >= 0.1.1, <= 0.1.1; >= 0.1.2, <= 0.1.2

## Suggested inspection (read-only)
- `python -m pip show claudeopusfile`: prints the installed version. Run with the environment that serves production active.

## Supported action
No complete vendor fix is recorded. Follow the primary source's mitigation guidance and check this record again before closing anything.

## Required regression checks
- Run the test suite and a production build.
- Exercise the features that depend on claudeopusfile.
- Repeat the inspection and confirm that only fixed versions remain installed.

## Rollback considerations
- Keep the previous lockfile and deployment artifact. Rolling back reinstates the vulnerable version, so apply any documented mitigation while you fix forward.

## Unresolved questions
- Which deployments run an affected version?
- Exploitation status can change. Check again before lowering the priority.
- Mark the work resolved only after the fixed version is verified in production.

## Sources
- Verified: https://osv.dev/vulnerability/MAL-2026-18298 (OSV record MAL-2026-18298 lists affected ranges: PyPI claudeopusfile >=0.1.1 =0.1.2 <=0.1.2)

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