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Unrated

Malicious code in asistenyorstore (npm)

GHSA-qgh5-36wr-3vvw

What to do

Vendor response not established. Follow the primary source's mitigation guidance and check back for a fix.

This page has no inventory attached, so it cannot say whether you are affected. A vendor fix is not proof that your deployment is fixed.

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Affected packages

  • npm asistenyorstore

    Affected
    every version
    Fixed in
    no fixed version recorded

Sources

Severity and exploitation
Exploitation
No confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next marks exploitation only from CISA KEV.
CVSS
not scored
EPSS
No dated EPSS signal available.
Source description

As published by the source; long descriptions are shortened.

--- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_

Source: amazon-inspector (af7e0a6300cbca6ace27dd4e4f5e296c6970c3b01a26022b185fe5423b37483d) This Baileys fork adds two undocumented code paths that use the installer's authenticated WhatsApp session to auto-follow newsletters controlled by the package author. In lib/Socket/socket.js, socketConnect() reconstructs a URL from a String.fromCharCode integer array that decodes to https://raw.github.com/skyzopedia/NewsletterID/refs/heads/main/VIP_Push.json, fetches a JSON list, and 200 seconds later issues w:mex IQ queries (query_id 7871414976211147) that follow each newsletter id under the caller's account. In lib/Utils/messages-media.js, loadBase() is wired into makeNewsletterSocket and, on a setTimeout, base64-decodes a second URL (https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Fyxzpediaa/Script-Script-Function-Bot-Apikey-Superiosjakaoqobxzobqshgttr/main/image-tohitam.json) and calls newsletterWMexQuery(item.id, QueryIds.FOLLOW) on each…

Dates and revisions
Published by the source
Last modified by the source
Source last checked
  1. Revision 1 · created ·

    Published from osv record MAL-2026-17891

Agent brief

Preview the exact text before you copy it. Commands are read-only suggestions; review them before running anything.

# Patch Next advisory brief: GHSA-qgh5-36wr-3vvw

Advisory: Malicious code in asistenyorstore (npm)
IDs: GHSA-qgh5-36wr-3vvw
Record: https://patchnext.com/advisories/mal-2026-17891 (revision 1, source checked 30 Oct 2026, 06:15 UTC)
Inventory: none attached. This brief comes from a public page and does not say whether any deployment is affected.
Severity: Unrated
Exploitation: no confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next confirms exploitation only from CISA KEV.
Vendor response: Vendor response not established. A vendor fix does not mean a deployment is fixed.

## Affected components
- npm asistenyorstore: affected every version

## Suggested inspection (read-only)
- `npm ls asistenyorstore --all`: lists every installed copy and version, including transitive ones. Run in the project root after `npm ci`.

## Supported action
No complete vendor fix is recorded. Follow the primary source's mitigation guidance and check this record again before closing anything.

## Required regression checks
- Run the test suite and a production build.
- Exercise the features that depend on asistenyorstore.
- Repeat the inspection and confirm that only fixed versions remain installed.

## Rollback considerations
- Keep the previous lockfile and deployment artifact. Rolling back reinstates the vulnerable version, so apply any documented mitigation while you fix forward.

## Unresolved questions
- Which deployments run an affected version?
- Exploitation status can change. Check again before lowering the priority.
- Mark the work resolved only after the fixed version is verified in production.

## Sources
- Verified: https://osv.dev/vulnerability/MAL-2026-17891 (OSV record MAL-2026-17891 lists affected ranges: npm asistenyorstore >=0)

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