Malicious code in proxyrobika (PyPI)
What to do
Vendor response not established. Follow the primary source's mitigation guidance and check back for a fix.
This page has no inventory attached, so it cannot say whether you are affected. A vendor fix is not proof that your deployment is fixed.
Affected packages
PyPI proxyrobika
- Affected
- >= 0.1.0, <= 0.1.0
- Fixed in
- no fixed version recorded
Sources
- Open Source Vulnerabilities (OSV.dev), including the GitHub Advisory Database
OSV record MAL-2026-17889 lists affected ranges: PyPI proxyrobika >=0.1.0 <=0.1.0
VerifiedObserved Structured OSV record; not marked as GitHub-reviewed.
Severity and exploitation
- Exploitation
- No confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next marks exploitation only from CISA KEV.
- CVSS
- not scored
- EPSS
- No dated EPSS signal available.
Source description
As published by the source; long descriptions are shortened.
--- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_
Source: amazon-inspector (5242a5c1d50ffd677c3b9b57e28a86baeb0179c10feef81380ef656eecf44206) The package exposes a single public function `starts()` that walks `/storage/emulated/0/` (the Android primary user-storage root used by Pydroid/Termux-like Python environments), collects every `.json`, `.py`, `.pyrubi`, and `.txt` file into ZIP archives, and uploads each archive via `requests.post` to `https://tapi.bale.ai/bot /sendDocument` with a hardcoded chat_id of `5263487757`. The Bale Messenger bot token is hardcoded in source (with an environment-variable fallback referencing the same literal). The destination, bot token, and chat_id are all author-controlled and not caller-configurable; the README is empty and the code uses single-letter identifiers to obscure behavior. Calling the only documented API therefore ships the caller's local source files, configuration, and Rubika scripts to a mailbox controlled by the package…
Dates and revisions
- Published by the source
- Last modified by the source
- Source last checked
- Revision 1 · created ·
Published from osv record MAL-2026-17889
Agent brief
Preview the exact text before you copy it. Commands are read-only suggestions; review them before running anything.
# Patch Next advisory brief: mal-2026-17889 Advisory: Malicious code in proxyrobika (PyPI) IDs: mal-2026-17889 Record: https://patchnext.com/advisories/mal-2026-17889 (revision 1, source checked 27 Oct 2026, 06:15 UTC) Inventory: none attached. This brief comes from a public page and does not say whether any deployment is affected. Severity: Unrated Exploitation: no confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next confirms exploitation only from CISA KEV. Vendor response: Vendor response not established. A vendor fix does not mean a deployment is fixed. ## Affected components - PyPI proxyrobika: affected >= 0.1.0, <= 0.1.0 ## Suggested inspection (read-only) - `python -m pip show proxyrobika`: prints the installed version. Run with the environment that serves production active. ## Supported action No complete vendor fix is recorded. Follow the primary source's mitigation guidance and check this record again before closing anything. ## Required regression checks - Run the test suite and a production build. - Exercise the features that depend on proxyrobika. - Repeat the inspection and confirm that only fixed versions remain installed. ## Rollback considerations - Keep the previous lockfile and deployment artifact. Rolling back reinstates the vulnerable version, so apply any documented mitigation while you fix forward. ## Unresolved questions - Which deployments run an affected version? - Exploitation status can change. Check again before lowering the priority. - Mark the work resolved only after the fixed version is verified in production. ## Sources - Verified: https://osv.dev/vulnerability/MAL-2026-17889 (OSV record MAL-2026-17889 lists affected ranges: PyPI proxyrobika >=0.1.0 <=0.1.0) Commands are suggestions: review each one before running it.
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