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High, CVSS 7.7amended

Trigger.dev: Server-side request forgery via unvalidated webhook alert-channel URL

CVE-2026-85650GHSA-xxv7-2vv3-h682

What to do

Vendor fix available. Upgrade each affected package to the fixed version on its release line (trigger.dev 4.5.2), redeploy, then verify what is actually installed.

This page has no inventory attached, so it cannot say whether you are affected. A vendor fix is not proof that your deployment is fixed.

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Affected packages

Sources

Severity and exploitation
Exploitation
No confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next marks exploitation only from CISA KEV.
CVSS
7.7 · CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N
EPSS
  • CVE-2026-85650: 0.35% estimated exploitation activity in the next 30 days; percentile 28.49 (FIRST EPSS, 2026-11-03). This is a model estimate, not proof of exploitation or customer exposure.
Source description

As published by the source; long descriptions are shortened.

Summary A project member can create a webhook alert channel whose delivery URL points at an internal address, and trigger.dev's control plane will send the alert there with no SSRF protection. The webhook URL is stored as an unvalidated string and is fetched directly from the webapp server, so a low-privilege authenticated user can make the server issue POST requests to internal-only services and cloud metadata endpoints (for example http://169.254.169.254/). No private-IP, scheme, or redirect filtering exists anywhere in the webapp. Details The delivery sink performs a raw fetch to the stored URL, apps/webapp/app/v3/services/alerts/deliverAlert.server.ts:949 (#deliverWebhook): The same pattern is in apps/webapp/app/v3/services/alerts/deliverErrorGroupAlert.server.ts:245. The URL is never validated. The stored shape is a bare string, apps/webapp/app/models/projectAlert.server.ts:6: The public API that creates alert channels accepts it with no constraint,…

Dates and revisions
Published by the source
Last modified by the source
Source last checked
  1. Revision 3 · amended ·

    Amended from ghsa record GHSA-xxv7-2vv3-h682

  2. Revision 2 · amended ·

    Amended from osv record GHSA-xxv7-2vv3-h682

  3. Revision 1 · created ·

    Published from ghsa record GHSA-xxv7-2vv3-h682

Agent brief

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# Patch Next advisory brief: CVE-2026-85650

Advisory: Trigger.dev: Server-side request forgery via unvalidated webhook alert-channel URL
IDs: CVE-2026-85650, GHSA-xxv7-2vv3-h682
Record: https://patchnext.com/advisories/ghsa-xxv7-2vv3-h682 (revision 3, source checked 26 Oct 2026, 13:06 UTC)
Inventory: none attached. This brief comes from a public page and does not say whether any deployment is affected.
Severity: High (CVSS 7.7)
Exploitation: no confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next confirms exploitation only from CISA KEV.
Vendor response: Vendor fix available; fixed versions by package: trigger.dev 4.5.2. A vendor fix does not mean a deployment is fixed.

## Affected components
- npm trigger.dev: affected < 4.5.2; fixed in 4.5.2

## Suggested inspection (read-only)
- `npm ls trigger.dev --all`: lists every installed copy and version, including transitive ones. Run in the project root after `npm ci`.

## Supported action
Upgrade each affected component to a fixed version on its release line. For a transitive dependency, upgrade the parent package or add an override or constraint, then regenerate the lockfile. Redeploy every environment that ran an affected version.

## Required regression checks
- Run the test suite and a production build.
- Exercise the features that depend on trigger.dev.
- Repeat the inspection and confirm that only fixed versions remain installed.

## Rollback considerations
- Keep the previous lockfile and deployment artifact. Rolling back reinstates the vulnerable version, so apply any documented mitigation while you fix forward.

## Unresolved questions
- Which deployments run an affected version?
- Exploitation status can change. Check again before lowering the priority.
- Mark the work resolved only after the fixed version is verified in production.

## Sources
- Verified: https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-xxv7-2vv3-h682 (GitHub-reviewed advisory GHSA-xxv7-2vv3-h682 lists affected ranges: npm trigger.dev >=0 <4.5.2)
- Verified: https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GHSA-xxv7-2vv3-h682 (OSV record GHSA-xxv7-2vv3-h682 lists affected ranges: npm trigger.dev >=0 <4.5.2 (fixed))

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