Incorrect TCR calculation in batchLiquidateTroves() during Recovery Mode

Exploitation

No confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next marks exploitation only from CISA KEV.

CVSS

3.1 · CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N

EPSS

No dated EPSS signal available.

As published by the source; long descriptions are shortened.

TCR is temporarily miscalculated in the batchLiquidateTroves function during Recovery Mode. The bug lies in batchLiquidateTroves of TroveManager. When calculating system's entire collateral, we should also exclude the liquidated trove's surplus collateral, since liquidation closes the trove and makes the surplus collateral claimable by the trove owner. This means, this line of code should look like this: Impact The miscalculated entire collateral is used only to calculate the TCR and check if the system has been able to exit Recovery Mode. The miscalulation only persists temporarily, and within thebatchLiquidateTroves transaction. Once the transaction completes the TCR and Recovery Mode will be calculated properly again. However, the bug could negatively impact the liquidation throughput and the gas efficiency gains from batching multiple liquidations in a single transaction. In normal situations, the impact of the collateral surplus of a Trove on the global TCR would be tiny. For…

Published by the source

5 Aug 2021, 16:56 UTC

Last modified by the source

9 Jan 2023, 05:04 UTC

Source last checked

26 Oct 2026, 12:15 UTC

1. Revision 2 · amended · 26 Oct 2026

   Amended from ghsa record GHSA-xh2p-7p87-fhgh

2. Revision 1 · created · 24 Oct 2026

   Published from osv record GHSA-xh2p-7p87-fhgh

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# Patch Next advisory brief: GHSA-xh2p-7p87-fhgh

Advisory: Incorrect TCR calculation in batchLiquidateTroves() during Recovery Mode
IDs: GHSA-xh2p-7p87-fhgh
Record: https://patchnext.com/advisories/ghsa-xh2p-7p87-fhgh (revision 2, source checked 26 Oct 2026, 12:15 UTC)
Inventory: none attached. This brief comes from a public page and does not say whether any deployment is affected.
Severity: Low (CVSS 3.1)
Exploitation: no confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next confirms exploitation only from CISA KEV.
Vendor response: Vendor response not established. A vendor fix does not mean a deployment is fixed.

## Affected components
- npm @liquity/contracts: affected <= 1.0.0

## Suggested inspection (read-only)
- `npm ls @liquity/contracts --all`: lists every installed copy and version, including transitive ones. Run in the project root after `npm ci`.

## Supported action
No complete vendor fix is recorded. Follow the primary source's mitigation guidance and check this record again before closing anything.

## Required regression checks
- Run the test suite and a production build.
- Exercise the features that depend on @liquity/contracts.
- Repeat the inspection and confirm that only fixed versions remain installed.

## Rollback considerations
- Keep the previous lockfile and deployment artifact. Rolling back reinstates the vulnerable version, so apply any documented mitigation while you fix forward.

## Unresolved questions
- Which deployments run an affected version?
- Exploitation status can change. Check again before lowering the priority.
- Mark the work resolved only after the fixed version is verified in production.

## Sources
- Verified: https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GHSA-xh2p-7p87-fhgh (OSV record GHSA-xh2p-7p87-fhgh lists affected ranges: npm @liquity/contracts >=0 <=1.0.0)
- Verified: https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-xh2p-7p87-fhgh (GitHub-reviewed advisory GHSA-xh2p-7p87-fhgh lists affected ranges: npm @liquity/contracts >=0 <=1.0.0)

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