Authorizer: Password reset token theft and full auth token redirect via unvalidated redirect_uri
What to do
Vendor fix available. Upgrade each affected package to the fixed version on its release line (github.com/authorizerdev/authorizer 0.0.0-20260329085140-6d9bef1aaba3), redeploy, then verify what is actually installed.
This page has no inventory attached, so it cannot say whether you are affected. A vendor fix is not proof that your deployment is fixed.
Affected packages
Go github.com/authorizerdev/authorizer
- Affected
- < 0.0.0-20260329085140-6d9bef1aaba3
- Fixed in
- 0.0.0-20260329085140-6d9bef1aaba3
Sources
- GitHub Advisory Database and maintainer security advisories on GitHub
GitHub-reviewed advisory GHSA-x3f4-v83f-7wp2 lists affected ranges: Go github.com/authorizerdev/authorizer >=0 <0.0.0-20260329085140-6d9bef1aaba3
VerifiedObserved Structured GitHub Advisory Database record (type=reviewed) from the GitHub REST API.
Severity and exploitation
- Exploitation
- No confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next marks exploitation only from CISA KEV.
- CVSS 4.0
- 8.6 · CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:A/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N · score source
- EPSS
- No dated EPSS signal available.
Source description
As published by the source; long descriptions are shortened.
Hi, I found that 6 endpoints in Authorizer accept a user-controlled redirecturi and append sensitive tokens to it without validating the URL against AllowedOrigins. The OAuth /app handler validates redirecturi at httphandlers/app.go:46, but the GraphQL mutations and verifyemail handler skip validation entirely. An attacker can steal password reset tokens, magic link tokens, and full auth sessions (accesstoken + idtoken + refreshtoken) by pointing redirecturi to their server. Verified against HEAD (commit 73679fa). Affected Endpoints 1. ForgotPassword (internal/graphql/forgotpassword.go:76-77) - password reset tokens 2. MagicLinkLogin (internal/graphql/magiclinklogin.go:150-151) - magic link auth tokens 3. Signup (internal/graphql/signup.go:211-212) - email verification tokens 4. InviteMembers (internal/graphql/invitemembers.go:90-91) - invitation tokens 5. OAuthLoginHandler (internal/httphandlers/oauthlogin.go:18-20) - OAuth redirect stored in state 6. VerifyEmailHandler…
Dates and revisions
- Published by the source
- Last modified by the source
- Source last checked
- Revision 1 · created ·
Published from ghsa record GHSA-x3f4-v83f-7wp2
Agent brief
Preview the exact text before you copy it. Commands are read-only suggestions; review them before running anything.
# Patch Next advisory brief: GHSA-x3f4-v83f-7wp2 Advisory: Authorizer: Password reset token theft and full auth token redirect via unvalidated redirect_uri IDs: GHSA-x3f4-v83f-7wp2 Record: https://patchnext.com/advisories/ghsa-x3f4-v83f-7wp2 (revision 1, source checked 26 Oct 2026, 15:19 UTC) Inventory: none attached. This brief comes from a public page and does not say whether any deployment is affected. Severity: High (CVSS 8.6) Exploitation: no confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next confirms exploitation only from CISA KEV. Vendor response: Vendor fix available; fixed versions by package: github.com/authorizerdev/authorizer 0.0.0-20260329085140-6d9bef1aaba3. A vendor fix does not mean a deployment is fixed. ## Affected components - Go github.com/authorizerdev/authorizer: affected < 0.0.0-20260329085140-6d9bef1aaba3; fixed in 0.0.0-20260329085140-6d9bef1aaba3 ## Suggested inspection (read-only) - Go github.com/authorizerdev/authorizer: check the installed version with your package manager. ## Supported action Upgrade each affected component to a fixed version on its release line. For a transitive dependency, upgrade the parent package or add an override or constraint, then regenerate the lockfile. Redeploy every environment that ran an affected version. ## Required regression checks - Run the test suite and a production build. - Exercise the features that depend on github.com/authorizerdev/authorizer. - Repeat the inspection and confirm that only fixed versions remain installed. ## Rollback considerations - Keep the previous lockfile and deployment artifact. Rolling back reinstates the vulnerable version, so apply any documented mitigation while you fix forward. ## Unresolved questions - Which deployments run an affected version? - Exploitation status can change. Check again before lowering the priority. - Mark the work resolved only after the fixed version is verified in production. ## Sources - Verified: https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-x3f4-v83f-7wp2 (GitHub-reviewed advisory GHSA-x3f4-v83f-7wp2 lists affected ranges: Go github.com/authorizerdev/authorizer >=0 <0.0.0-20260329085140-6d9bef1aaba3) Commands are suggestions: review each one before running it.
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