MarbleRun unauthenticated recovery allows Coordinator impersonation

Exploitation

No confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next marks exploitation only from CISA KEV.

CVSS

7.1 · CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:L/I:H/A:N

EPSS

No dated EPSS signal available.

As published by the source; long descriptions are shortened.

Impact During recovery, a Coordinator only verifies that a given recovery key decrypts the sealed state, not if this key was provided by a party with access to one of the recovery keys defined in the manifest. This allows an attacker to manually craft a sealed state using their own recovery keys, and a manifest that does not match the rest of the state. If network traffic is redirected from the legitimate coordinator to the attacker's Coordinator, a remote party is susceptible to impersonation if they verify the Coordinator without comparing the root certificate of the Coordinator against a trusted reference. Under these circumstances, an attacker can trick a remote party into trusting the malicious Coordinator by presenting a manifest that does not match the actual state of the deployment. This issue does not affect the following: secrets and state of the legitimate Coordinator instances integrity of workloads certificates chaining back to the legitimate Coordinator root certificate…

Published by the source

4 Feb 2025, 21:23 UTC

Last modified by the source

6 Feb 2025, 18:04 UTC

Source last checked

26 Oct 2026, 15:08 UTC

1. Revision 1 · created · 26 Oct 2026

   Published from ghsa record GHSA-w7wm-2425-7p2h

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# Patch Next advisory brief: GHSA-w7wm-2425-7p2h

Advisory: MarbleRun unauthenticated recovery allows Coordinator impersonation
IDs: GHSA-w7wm-2425-7p2h
Record: https://patchnext.com/advisories/ghsa-w7wm-2425-7p2h (revision 1, source checked 26 Oct 2026, 15:08 UTC)
Inventory: none attached. This brief comes from a public page and does not say whether any deployment is affected.
Severity: High (CVSS 7.1)
Exploitation: no confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next confirms exploitation only from CISA KEV.
Vendor response: Vendor fix available; fixed versions by package: github.com/edgelesssys/marblerun 1.7.0. A vendor fix does not mean a deployment is fixed.

## Affected components
- Go github.com/edgelesssys/marblerun: affected < 1.7.0; fixed in 1.7.0

## Suggested inspection (read-only)
- Go github.com/edgelesssys/marblerun: check the installed version with your package manager.

## Supported action
Upgrade each affected component to a fixed version on its release line. For a transitive dependency, upgrade the parent package or add an override or constraint, then regenerate the lockfile. Redeploy every environment that ran an affected version.

## Required regression checks
- Run the test suite and a production build.
- Exercise the features that depend on github.com/edgelesssys/marblerun.
- Repeat the inspection and confirm that only fixed versions remain installed.

## Rollback considerations
- Keep the previous lockfile and deployment artifact. Rolling back reinstates the vulnerable version, so apply any documented mitigation while you fix forward.

## Unresolved questions
- Which deployments run an affected version?
- Exploitation status can change. Check again before lowering the priority.
- Mark the work resolved only after the fixed version is verified in production.

## Sources
- Verified: https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-w7wm-2425-7p2h (GitHub-reviewed advisory GHSA-w7wm-2425-7p2h lists affected ranges: Go github.com/edgelesssys/marblerun >=0 <1.7.0)

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