pnpm: Environment secrets exfiltrated via env-placeholder expansion in proxy settings read from an untrusted pnpm-workspace.yaml

Exploitation

No confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next marks exploitation only from CISA KEV.

CVSS

7.4 · CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N

EPSS

No dated EPSS signal available.

As published by the source; long descriptions are shortened.

Summary pnpm expands ${VAR} environment placeholders in the httpProxy / httpsProxy / noProxy settings read from a project's pnpm-workspace.yaml. Because a project manifest is repository-controlled, a malicious repository that a victim merely clones and runs pnpm install in can route all install traffic through an attacker proxy whose hostname or userinfo embeds — and thereby exfiltrates — an environment secret such as NPMTOKEN or GITHUBTOKEN. This bypasses a trust boundary pnpm deliberately enforces: env-placeholder expansion of request-destination settings is already suppressed for registry, pnprServer, registries and namedRegistries when they come from an untrusted project manifest, and the sibling .npmrc reader already classifies the proxy keys as request destinations. The manifest-side guard set simply omitted them. Impact An attacker who controls only the contents of a repository's pnpm-workspace.yaml — a public repo, a fork, or a supply-chain pull request — can read many values…

Published by the source

1 Sep 2026, 19:22 UTC

Last modified by the source

1 Sep 2026, 19:22 UTC

Source last checked

26 Oct 2026, 13:02 UTC

1. Revision 1 · created · 26 Oct 2026

   Published from ghsa record GHSA-vx52-2968-3vc6

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# Patch Next advisory brief: GHSA-vx52-2968-3vc6

Advisory: pnpm: Environment secrets exfiltrated via env-placeholder expansion in proxy settings read from an untrusted pnpm-workspace.yaml
IDs: GHSA-vx52-2968-3vc6
Record: https://patchnext.com/advisories/ghsa-vx52-2968-3vc6 (revision 1, source checked 26 Oct 2026, 13:02 UTC)
Inventory: none attached. This brief comes from a public page and does not say whether any deployment is affected.
Severity: High (CVSS 7.4)
Exploitation: no confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next confirms exploitation only from CISA KEV.
Vendor response: Vendor fix available; fixed versions by package: pnpm 11.11.0, 10.34.5. A vendor fix does not mean a deployment is fixed.

## Affected components
- npm pnpm: affected >= 11.0.0, < 11.11.0; >= 10.7.0, < 10.34.5; fixed in 10.34.5, 11.11.0

## Suggested inspection (read-only)
- `npm ls pnpm --all`: lists every installed copy and version, including transitive ones. Run in the project root after `npm ci`.

## Supported action
Upgrade each affected component to a fixed version on its release line. For a transitive dependency, upgrade the parent package or add an override or constraint, then regenerate the lockfile. Redeploy every environment that ran an affected version.

## Required regression checks
- Run the test suite and a production build.
- Exercise the features that depend on pnpm.
- Repeat the inspection and confirm that only fixed versions remain installed.

## Rollback considerations
- Keep the previous lockfile and deployment artifact. Rolling back reinstates the vulnerable version, so apply any documented mitigation while you fix forward.

## Unresolved questions
- Which deployments run an affected version?
- Exploitation status can change. Check again before lowering the priority.
- Mark the work resolved only after the fixed version is verified in production.

## Sources
- Verified: https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-vx52-2968-3vc6 (GitHub-reviewed advisory GHSA-vx52-2968-3vc6 lists affected ranges: npm pnpm >=11.0.0 =10.7.0 <10.34.5)

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