Taylor has race condition in /get-patch that allows purchase token replay

Exploitation

No confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next marks exploitation only from CISA KEV.

CVSS

not scored

EPSS

No dated EPSS signal available.

As published by the source; long descriptions are shortened.

Hi team, I was looking at the recent fix and you limited the exploitability of race conditions but unfortunately it is still possible to exploit the issue since two requests happening at the exact same time will still go through. You should be able to completely fix the race conditions by leveraging SQLITE write lock and just send one query. Summary The /get-patch endpoint processes a purchase in two separate database queries: a SELECT that verifies the token is unused, followed by an UPDATE that marks the token as used. Because SQLite only guards each statement, a malicious actor can issue two requests at the exact same moment and have both SELECT statements succeed before either UPDATE runs. Details The handler executes (step 1): If tokenusedat IS NULL, the request passes the check (step 2): The handler finally runs (step 3): When two requests arrive at the same time, they both finish step 1 while the row is still unused. SQLite serializes writers only per statement, so each…

Published by the source

27 Jun 2025, 22:06 UTC

Last modified by the source

30 Jun 2025, 12:53 UTC

Source last checked

26 Oct 2026, 12:37 UTC

1. Revision 2 · amended · 26 Oct 2026

   Amended from ghsa record GHSA-vh5j-5fhq-9xwg

2. Revision 1 · created · 24 Oct 2026

   Published from osv record GHSA-vh5j-5fhq-9xwg

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# Patch Next advisory brief: GHSA-vh5j-5fhq-9xwg

Advisory: Taylor has race condition in /get-patch that allows purchase token replay
IDs: GHSA-vh5j-5fhq-9xwg
Record: https://patchnext.com/advisories/ghsa-vh5j-5fhq-9xwg (revision 2, source checked 26 Oct 2026, 12:37 UTC)
Inventory: none attached. This brief comes from a public page and does not say whether any deployment is affected.
Severity: Unrated
Exploitation: no confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next confirms exploitation only from CISA KEV.
Vendor response: Vendor fix available; fixed versions by package: taylored 8.1.3. A vendor fix does not mean a deployment is fixed.

## Affected components
- npm taylored: affected <= 8.1.2; fixed in 8.1.3

## Suggested inspection (read-only)
- `npm ls taylored --all`: lists every installed copy and version, including transitive ones. Run in the project root after `npm ci`.

## Supported action
Upgrade each affected component to a fixed version on its release line. For a transitive dependency, upgrade the parent package or add an override or constraint, then regenerate the lockfile. Redeploy every environment that ran an affected version.

## Required regression checks
- Run the test suite and a production build.
- Exercise the features that depend on taylored.
- Repeat the inspection and confirm that only fixed versions remain installed.

## Rollback considerations
- Keep the previous lockfile and deployment artifact. Rolling back reinstates the vulnerable version, so apply any documented mitigation while you fix forward.

## Unresolved questions
- Which deployments run an affected version?
- Exploitation status can change. Check again before lowering the priority.
- Mark the work resolved only after the fixed version is verified in production.

## Sources
- Verified: https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GHSA-vh5j-5fhq-9xwg (OSV record GHSA-vh5j-5fhq-9xwg lists affected ranges: npm taylored >=0 <8.1.3 (fixed))
- Verified: https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-vh5j-5fhq-9xwg (GitHub-reviewed advisory GHSA-vh5j-5fhq-9xwg lists affected ranges: npm taylored >=0 <=8.1.2)

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