Miner fails to get block template when a cell used as a cell dep has been destroyed.

Exploitation

No confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next marks exploitation only from CISA KEV.

CVSS

not scored

EPSS

No dated EPSS signal available.

As published by the source; long descriptions are shortened.

Impact The RPC getblocktemplate fails when a cell has been used as a cell dep and an input in the different transactions. Say cell C is used as a dep group in the transaction A, and is destroyed in the transaction B. The node adds transaction A first, then B into the transaction pool. They are both valid. But when generating the block template, if the fee rate of B is higher, it comes before A, which will invalidate A. Currently the RPC getblocktemplate will fail instead of dropping A. Patch First, the getblocktemplate should not fail but dropping the conflict transactions. Then we can propose solution to this issue. Here is an example. When a transaction is added to the pool, the pool must consider it depending on all the transactions which dep cell (direct or indirect via dep group) has been destroyed in this transaction. Because future transactions using the destroyed cells as dep will be rejected, the spending transaction only need to wait for all the existing dep transactions on…

Published by the source

25 Aug 2021, 21:01 UTC

Last modified by the source

11 Jan 2023, 05:05 UTC

Source last checked

26 Oct 2026, 15:33 UTC

1. Revision 1 · created · 26 Oct 2026

   Published from ghsa record GHSA-v666-6w97-pcwm

Preview the exact text before you copy it. Commands are read-only suggestions; review them before running anything.

# Patch Next advisory brief: GHSA-v666-6w97-pcwm

Advisory: Miner fails to get block template when a cell used as a cell dep has been destroyed.
IDs: GHSA-v666-6w97-pcwm
Record: https://patchnext.com/advisories/ghsa-v666-6w97-pcwm (revision 1, source checked 26 Oct 2026, 15:33 UTC)
Inventory: none attached. This brief comes from a public page and does not say whether any deployment is affected.
Severity: Unrated
Exploitation: no confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next confirms exploitation only from CISA KEV.
Vendor response: Vendor fix available; fixed versions by package: ckb 0.40.0. A vendor fix does not mean a deployment is fixed.

## Affected components
- crates.io ckb: affected < 0.40.0; fixed in 0.40.0

## Suggested inspection (read-only)
- crates.io ckb: check the installed version with your package manager.

## Supported action
Upgrade each affected component to a fixed version on its release line. For a transitive dependency, upgrade the parent package or add an override or constraint, then regenerate the lockfile. Redeploy every environment that ran an affected version.

## Required regression checks
- Run the test suite and a production build.
- Exercise the features that depend on ckb.
- Repeat the inspection and confirm that only fixed versions remain installed.

## Rollback considerations
- Keep the previous lockfile and deployment artifact. Rolling back reinstates the vulnerable version, so apply any documented mitigation while you fix forward.

## Unresolved questions
- Which deployments run an affected version?
- Exploitation status can change. Check again before lowering the priority.
- Mark the work resolved only after the fixed version is verified in production.

## Sources
- Verified: https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-v666-6w97-pcwm (GitHub-reviewed advisory GHSA-v666-6w97-pcwm lists affected ranges: crates.io ckb >=0 <0.40.0)

Commands are suggestions: review each one before running it.