Poweradmin: Broken access control (IDOR): any zone owner can modify DNS records in zones they do not own

Exploitation

No confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next marks exploitation only from CISA KEV.

CVSS

8.1 · CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H

EPSS

No dated EPSS signal available.

As published by the source; long descriptions are shortened.

Affected software - Product: Poweradmin (web front-end for PowerDNS) - Version tested: master, commit 7f28c3a97 (also reachable in the 4.x release line — the record-edit code is the same) - Component: record editing (web UI) - Vulnerability type: Broken Access Control / Insecure Direct Object Reference Severity Any authenticated user who owns at least one zone can tamper with records in every other zone on the server. In a shared/multi-tenant Poweradmin install this is effectively a cross-tenant DNS takeover. Summary When you save a record edit, Poweradmin checks whether you're allowed to touch the record by looking at a zone id you send in the POST body, but it then applies the change to a record id you also send in the POST body. Nothing checks that the record id actually belongs to that zone id. So you point the permission check at a zone you legitimately own, point the record id at somebody else's record, and the update goes through. A low-privilege "Editor" who only owns…

Published by the source

24 Jul 2026, 21:55 UTC

Last modified by the source

24 Jul 2026, 21:55 UTC

Source last checked

26 Oct 2026, 14:50 UTC

1. Revision 1 · created · 26 Oct 2026

   Published from ghsa record GHSA-rm67-g9ch-vxff

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# Patch Next advisory brief: GHSA-rm67-g9ch-vxff

Advisory: Poweradmin: Broken access control (IDOR): any zone owner can modify DNS records in zones they do not own
IDs: GHSA-rm67-g9ch-vxff
Record: https://patchnext.com/advisories/ghsa-rm67-g9ch-vxff (revision 1, source checked 26 Oct 2026, 14:50 UTC)
Inventory: none attached. This brief comes from a public page and does not say whether any deployment is affected.
Severity: High (CVSS 8.1)
Exploitation: no confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next confirms exploitation only from CISA KEV.
Vendor response: Vendor fix available; fixed versions by package: poweradmin/poweradmin 4.3.4, 4.2.5, 3.9.11. A vendor fix does not mean a deployment is fixed.

## Affected components
- Packagist poweradmin/poweradmin: affected >= 3.0.0, < 3.9.11; >= 4.0.0, < 4.2.5; >= 4.3.0, < 4.3.4; fixed in 4.3.4, 4.2.5, 3.9.11

## Suggested inspection (read-only)
- Packagist poweradmin/poweradmin: check the installed version with your package manager.

## Supported action
Upgrade each affected component to a fixed version on its release line. For a transitive dependency, upgrade the parent package or add an override or constraint, then regenerate the lockfile. Redeploy every environment that ran an affected version.

## Required regression checks
- Run the test suite and a production build.
- Exercise the features that depend on poweradmin/poweradmin.
- Repeat the inspection and confirm that only fixed versions remain installed.

## Rollback considerations
- Keep the previous lockfile and deployment artifact. Rolling back reinstates the vulnerable version, so apply any documented mitigation while you fix forward.

## Unresolved questions
- Which deployments run an affected version?
- Exploitation status can change. Check again before lowering the priority.
- Mark the work resolved only after the fixed version is verified in production.

## Sources
- Verified: https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-rm67-g9ch-vxff (GitHub-reviewed advisory GHSA-rm67-g9ch-vxff lists affected ranges: Packagist poweradmin/poweradmin >=3.0.0 =4.0.0 =4.3.0 <4.3.4)

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