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High, CVSS 7.7

chi's RealIP Middleware allows IP spoofing via unvalidated X-Forwarded-For header

GHSA-rjr7-jggh-pgcp

What to do

Partial vendor fix. Follow the primary source's mitigation guidance and check back for a fix.

This page has no inventory attached, so it cannot say whether you are affected. A vendor fix is not proof that your deployment is fixed.

Affected packages

  • Go github.com/go-chi/chi/v2/middleware

    Affected
    <= 2.1.1
    Fixed in
    no fixed version recorded
  • Go github.com/go-chi/chi/v3/middleware

    Affected
    <= 3.3.5
    Fixed in
    no fixed version recorded
  • Go github.com/go-chi/chi/v5/middleware

    Affected
    < 5.3.0
    Fixed in
    5.3.0
  • Go github.com/go-chi/chi/v4/middleware

    Affected
    <= 4.1.3
    Fixed in
    no fixed version recorded
  • Go github.com/go-chi/chi/middleware

    Affected
    <= 1.5.5
    Fixed in
    no fixed version recorded

Sources

Severity and exploitation
Exploitation
No confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next marks exploitation only from CISA KEV.
CVSS 4.0
7.7 · CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:P · score source
EPSS
No dated EPSS signal available.
Source description

As published by the source; long descriptions are shortened.

Summary realip middleware in go-chi/chi trusts headers like x-forwarded-for without checking them, so attackers can fake their ip and bypass rate limits or access controls Details the vuln is in middleware/realip.go , the realIP() function pulls IPs straight from client headers and replaces r.RemoteAddr without checking if the request came from a trusted proxy no trusted proxy cidr check in place, any client can send these headers PoC create a server with chi and use realip middleware spoofed the ip to bypass access control Impact - ip-based access control bypass lets attackers reach restricted endpoints - rate limiting bypass lets attackers avoid limits by rotating spoofed ips - audit logs show fake ips picked by attacker instead of real ones - attackers can get around geo ip restrictions Remediation Recommendation validate proxy cidr first before trusting forwarded ip headers

Dates and revisions
Published by the source
Last modified by the source
Source last checked
  1. Revision 1 · created ·

    Published from ghsa record GHSA-rjr7-jggh-pgcp

Agent brief

Preview the exact text before you copy it. Commands are read-only suggestions; review them before running anything.

# Patch Next advisory brief: GHSA-rjr7-jggh-pgcp

Advisory: chi's RealIP Middleware allows IP spoofing via unvalidated X-Forwarded-For header
IDs: GHSA-rjr7-jggh-pgcp
Record: https://patchnext.com/advisories/ghsa-rjr7-jggh-pgcp (revision 1, source checked 26 Oct 2026, 15:24 UTC)
Inventory: none attached. This brief comes from a public page and does not say whether any deployment is affected.
Severity: High (CVSS 7.7)
Exploitation: no confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next confirms exploitation only from CISA KEV.
Vendor response: Partial vendor fix; fixed versions by package: github.com/go-chi/chi/v5/middleware 5.3.0. A vendor fix does not mean a deployment is fixed.

## Affected components
- Go github.com/go-chi/chi/v2/middleware: affected <= 2.1.1
- Go github.com/go-chi/chi/v3/middleware: affected <= 3.3.5
- Go github.com/go-chi/chi/v5/middleware: affected < 5.3.0; fixed in 5.3.0
- Go github.com/go-chi/chi/v4/middleware: affected <= 4.1.3
- Go github.com/go-chi/chi/middleware: affected <= 1.5.5

## Suggested inspection (read-only)
- Go github.com/go-chi/chi/v2/middleware: check the installed version with your package manager.
- Go github.com/go-chi/chi/v3/middleware: check the installed version with your package manager.
- Go github.com/go-chi/chi/v5/middleware: check the installed version with your package manager.
- Go github.com/go-chi/chi/v4/middleware: check the installed version with your package manager.
- Go github.com/go-chi/chi/middleware: check the installed version with your package manager.

## Supported action
No complete vendor fix is recorded. Follow the primary source's mitigation guidance and check this record again before closing anything.

## Required regression checks
- Run the test suite and a production build.
- Exercise the features that depend on github.com/go-chi/chi/v2/middleware, github.com/go-chi/chi/v3/middleware, github.com/go-chi/chi/v5/middleware, github.com/go-chi/chi/v4/middleware, github.com/go-chi/chi/middleware.
- Repeat the inspection and confirm that only fixed versions remain installed.

## Rollback considerations
- Keep the previous lockfile and deployment artifact. Rolling back reinstates the vulnerable version, so apply any documented mitigation while you fix forward.

## Unresolved questions
- Which deployments run an affected version?
- Exploitation status can change. Check again before lowering the priority.
- Mark the work resolved only after the fixed version is verified in production.

## Sources
- Verified: https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-rjr7-jggh-pgcp (GitHub-reviewed advisory GHSA-rjr7-jggh-pgcp lists affected ranges: Go github.com/go-chi/chi/middleware >=0 =0 =0 =0 =0 <5.3.0)

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