Ech0 comment model's Email field returned on public /api/comments endpoints

Exploitation

No confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next marks exploitation only from CISA KEV.

CVSS

5.3 · CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N

EPSS

No dated EPSS signal available.

As published by the source; long descriptions are shortened.

Summary The Comment model serializes its Email field through the public comment-listing API. internal/model/comment/comment.go:33 uses json:"email", while adjacent PII fields (IPHash, UserAgent) correctly use json:"-". The public endpoints GET /api/comments?echoid=X and GET /api/comments/public?limit=N both live on PublicRouterGroup with no authentication. Alice retrieves every guest commenter's email address on the instance with a few unauthenticated HTTP calls. Details The Comment model at internal/model/comment/comment.go:33: The json:"-" on IPHash and UserAgent shows the developer's intent: hide server-side PII from API responses. The Email field missed the same tag. GORM materializes the full struct and the Gin handler returns it verbatim. Routes at internal/router/comment.go:20 and comment public-feed route: Both handlers call ListPublicByEchoID (service at internal/service/comment/comment.go:329) or ListPublicComments (service at :340), both of which return the slice of…

Published by the source

7 May 2026, 21:16 UTC

Last modified by the source

7 May 2026, 21:16 UTC

Source last checked

26 Oct 2026, 15:20 UTC

1. Revision 1 · created · 26 Oct 2026

   Published from ghsa record GHSA-rj4g-rqgh-rx9h

Preview the exact text before you copy it. Commands are read-only suggestions; review them before running anything.

# Patch Next advisory brief: GHSA-rj4g-rqgh-rx9h

Advisory: Ech0 comment model's Email field returned on public /api/comments endpoints
IDs: GHSA-rj4g-rqgh-rx9h
Record: https://patchnext.com/advisories/ghsa-rj4g-rqgh-rx9h (revision 1, source checked 26 Oct 2026, 15:20 UTC)
Inventory: none attached. This brief comes from a public page and does not say whether any deployment is affected.
Severity: Medium (CVSS 5.3)
Exploitation: no confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next confirms exploitation only from CISA KEV.
Vendor response: Vendor fix available; fixed versions by package: github.com/lin-snow/Ech0 1.4.8-0.20260503034700-cb8d7a997dd8. A vendor fix does not mean a deployment is fixed.

## Affected components
- Go github.com/lin-snow/Ech0: affected < 1.4.8-0.20260503034700-cb8d7a997dd8; fixed in 1.4.8-0.20260503034700-cb8d7a997dd8

## Suggested inspection (read-only)
- Go github.com/lin-snow/Ech0: check the installed version with your package manager.

## Supported action
Upgrade each affected component to a fixed version on its release line. For a transitive dependency, upgrade the parent package or add an override or constraint, then regenerate the lockfile. Redeploy every environment that ran an affected version.

## Required regression checks
- Run the test suite and a production build.
- Exercise the features that depend on github.com/lin-snow/Ech0.
- Repeat the inspection and confirm that only fixed versions remain installed.

## Rollback considerations
- Keep the previous lockfile and deployment artifact. Rolling back reinstates the vulnerable version, so apply any documented mitigation while you fix forward.

## Unresolved questions
- Which deployments run an affected version?
- Exploitation status can change. Check again before lowering the priority.
- Mark the work resolved only after the fixed version is verified in production.

## Sources
- Verified: https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-rj4g-rqgh-rx9h (GitHub-reviewed advisory GHSA-rj4g-rqgh-rx9h lists affected ranges: Go github.com/lin-snow/Ech0 >=0 <1.4.8-0.20260503034700-cb8d7a997dd8)

Commands are suggestions: review each one before running it.