LXD has project restriction bypass in instance copy across projects
What to do
Vendor fix available. Upgrade each affected package to the fixed version on its release line (github.com/canonical/lxd 0.0.0-20260630083100-c5184be310b1), redeploy, then verify what is actually installed.
This page has no inventory attached, so it cannot say whether you are affected. A vendor fix is not proof that your deployment is fixed.
Affected packages
- Affected
- < 0.0.0-20260630083100-c5184be310b1
- Fixed in
- 0.0.0-20260630083100-c5184be310b1
Sources
- GitHub Advisory Database and maintainer security advisories on GitHub
GitHub-reviewed advisory GHSA-qx75-2p3r-pwm5 lists affected ranges: Go github.com/canonical/lxd >=0 <0.0.0-20260630083100-c5184be310b1
VerifiedObserved Structured GitHub Advisory Database record (type=reviewed) from the GitHub REST API.
- Open Source Vulnerabilities (OSV.dev), including the GitHub Advisory Database
OSV record GHSA-qx75-2p3r-pwm5 lists affected ranges: Go github.com/canonical/lxd >=0 <0.0.0-20260630083100-c5184be310b1 (fixed)
VerifiedObserved Structured OSV record; GitHub-reviewed advisory.
Severity and exploitation
- Exploitation
- No confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next marks exploitation only from CISA KEV.
- CVSS
- 7.7 · CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N
- EPSS
- No dated EPSS signal available.
Source description
As published by the source; long descriptions are shortened.
Reported from https://github.com/lxc/incus/security/advisories/GHSA-c9f5-j9c3-mhrg
Summary Missing authorization checks exist for instance copying where an attacker knowing the name of a project that they don't have access to and the name of an instance in that project can copy the instance to a new project. This issue could allow an attacker to access secrets in instances they are not authorized to access.
Details `cmd/incusd/instances.go` authorizes `POST /1.0/instances` against the target project. In the copy path, `cmd/incusd/instances_post.go` then loads the source instance from `req.Source.Project` without checking whether the caller can view that source instance. From my understanding, the copy must occur on the same server. However, once the copy has been done, nothing prevents a malicious actor from moving the instance to another server.
PoC
Setup We assume the target server is remotely accessible and a user/certificate has been added. ```
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Dates and revisions
- Published by the source
- Last modified by the source
- Source last checked
- Revision 2 · amended ·
Amended from osv record GHSA-qx75-2p3r-pwm5
- Revision 1 · created ·
Published from ghsa record GHSA-qx75-2p3r-pwm5
Agent brief
Preview the exact text before you copy it. Commands are read-only suggestions; review them before running anything.
# Patch Next advisory brief: GHSA-qx75-2p3r-pwm5 Advisory: LXD has project restriction bypass in instance copy across projects IDs: GHSA-qx75-2p3r-pwm5 Record: https://patchnext.com/advisories/ghsa-qx75-2p3r-pwm5 (revision 2, source checked 7 Nov 2026, 06:05 UTC) Inventory: none attached. This brief comes from a public page and does not say whether any deployment is affected. Severity: High (CVSS 7.7) Exploitation: no confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next confirms exploitation only from CISA KEV. Vendor response: Vendor fix available; fixed versions by package: github.com/canonical/lxd 0.0.0-20260630083100-c5184be310b1. A vendor fix does not mean a deployment is fixed. ## Affected components - Go github.com/canonical/lxd: affected < 0.0.0-20260630083100-c5184be310b1; fixed in 0.0.0-20260630083100-c5184be310b1 ## Suggested inspection (read-only) - Go github.com/canonical/lxd: check the installed version with your package manager. ## Supported action Upgrade each affected component to a fixed version on its release line. For a transitive dependency, upgrade the parent package or add an override or constraint, then regenerate the lockfile. Redeploy every environment that ran an affected version. ## Required regression checks - Run the test suite and a production build. - Exercise the features that depend on github.com/canonical/lxd. - Repeat the inspection and confirm that only fixed versions remain installed. ## Rollback considerations - Keep the previous lockfile and deployment artifact. Rolling back reinstates the vulnerable version, so apply any documented mitigation while you fix forward. ## Unresolved questions - Which deployments run an affected version? - Exploitation status can change. Check again before lowering the priority. - Mark the work resolved only after the fixed version is verified in production. ## Sources - Verified: https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-qx75-2p3r-pwm5 (GitHub-reviewed advisory GHSA-qx75-2p3r-pwm5 lists affected ranges: Go github.com/canonical/lxd >=0 <0.0.0-20260630083100-c5184be310b1) - Verified: https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GHSA-qx75-2p3r-pwm5 (OSV record GHSA-qx75-2p3r-pwm5 lists affected ranges: Go github.com/canonical/lxd >=0 <0.0.0-20260630083100-c5184be310b1 (fixed)) Commands are suggestions: review each one before running it.
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