block_buffer: panic corrupts inline buffer position
What to do
Vendor fix available. Upgrade each affected package to the fixed version on its release line (block_buffer 0.12.1), redeploy, then verify what is actually installed.
This page has no inventory attached, so it cannot say whether you are affected. A vendor fix is not proof that your deployment is fixed.
Affected packages
crates.io block_buffer
- Affected
- >= 0.11.0, < 0.12.1
- Fixed in
- 0.12.1
Sources
- Open Source Vulnerabilities (OSV.dev), including the GitHub Advisory Database
OSV record GHSA-qwgh-2vcv-g2f7 lists affected ranges: crates.io block_buffer >=0 <0.12.1 (fixed)
VerifiedObserved Structured OSV record; GitHub-reviewed advisory.
- GitHub Advisory Database and maintainer security advisories on GitHub
GitHub-reviewed advisory GHSA-qwgh-2vcv-g2f7 lists affected ranges: crates.io block_buffer >=0 <0.12.1
VerifiedObserved Structured GitHub Advisory Database record (type=reviewed) from the GitHub REST API.
- GitHub Advisory Database and maintainer security advisories on GitHub
GitHub-reviewed advisory GHSA-qwgh-2vcv-g2f7 lists affected ranges: crates.io block_buffer >=0.11.0 <0.12.1
VerifiedObserved Structured GitHub Advisory Database record (type=reviewed) from the GitHub REST API.
- Open Source Vulnerabilities (OSV.dev), including the GitHub Advisory Database
OSV record GHSA-qwgh-2vcv-g2f7 lists affected ranges: crates.io block_buffer >=0.11.0 <0.12.1 (fixed)
VerifiedObserved Structured OSV record; GitHub-reviewed advisory.
Severity and exploitation
- Exploitation
- No confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next marks exploitation only from CISA KEV.
- CVSS 4.0
- 6.3 · CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N · score source
- EPSS
- No dated EPSS signal available.
Source description
As published by the source; long descriptions are shortened.
Summary A caught panic may leave the cursor position of `EagerBuffer` or `ReadBuffer` in a corrupted state; this in turn allows out-of-bounds reads/writes.
Details & PoC The following two tests fail miri: ```rust #[cfg(miri)] #[test] fn eager_digest_blocks_panic_corrupts_inline_position() { // `EagerBuffer` stores its cursor in the last byte of the internal block. // When `digest_blocks` completes a previously partial block, it overwrites // that byte with input data before invoking the caller-provided `compress` // callback. If the callback panics, safe code can catch the panic and keep // using the buffer while its cursor byte no longer satisfies the internal // `pos ::new(&[1, 2]); let _ = std::panic::catch_unwind(std::panic::AssertUnwindSafe(|| { buf.digest_blocks(&[3, 0xff], |_| panic!("simulated compression failure")); })); let _ = buf.get_pos(); } #[cfg(miri)] #[test] fn read_buffer_generator_panic_corrupts_inline_position() { // `ReadBuffer` stores its cursor in…
Dates and revisions
- Published by the source
- Last modified by the source
- Source last checked
- Revision 5 · amended ·
Amended from osv record GHSA-qwgh-2vcv-g2f7
- Revision 4 · amended ·
Amended from ghsa record GHSA-qwgh-2vcv-g2f7
- Revision 3 · amended ·
Amended from ghsa record GHSA-qwgh-2vcv-g2f7
- Revision 2 · amended ·
Reviewed OSV alias/range/CVSS4 correction; package source scopes and original publication preserved. No customer finding resolved.
- Revision 1 · created ·
Published from osv record GHSA-qwgh-2vcv-g2f7
Agent brief
Preview the exact text before you copy it. Commands are read-only suggestions; review them before running anything.
# Patch Next advisory brief: GHSA-qwgh-2vcv-g2f7 Advisory: block_buffer: panic corrupts inline buffer position IDs: GHSA-qwgh-2vcv-g2f7 Record: https://patchnext.com/advisories/ghsa-qwgh-2vcv-g2f7 (revision 5, source checked 31 Oct 2026, 06:45 UTC) Inventory: none attached. This brief comes from a public page and does not say whether any deployment is affected. Severity: Medium (CVSS 6.3) Exploitation: no confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next confirms exploitation only from CISA KEV. Vendor response: Vendor fix available; fixed versions by package: block_buffer 0.12.1. A vendor fix does not mean a deployment is fixed. ## Affected components - crates.io block_buffer: affected >= 0.11.0, < 0.12.1; fixed in 0.12.1 ## Suggested inspection (read-only) - crates.io block_buffer: check the installed version with your package manager. ## Supported action Upgrade each affected component to a fixed version on its release line. For a transitive dependency, upgrade the parent package or add an override or constraint, then regenerate the lockfile. Redeploy every environment that ran an affected version. ## Required regression checks - Run the test suite and a production build. - Exercise the features that depend on block_buffer. - Repeat the inspection and confirm that only fixed versions remain installed. ## Rollback considerations - Keep the previous lockfile and deployment artifact. Rolling back reinstates the vulnerable version, so apply any documented mitigation while you fix forward. ## Unresolved questions - Which deployments run an affected version? - Exploitation status can change. Check again before lowering the priority. - Mark the work resolved only after the fixed version is verified in production. ## Sources - Verified: https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GHSA-qwgh-2vcv-g2f7 (OSV record GHSA-qwgh-2vcv-g2f7 lists affected ranges: crates.io block_buffer >=0 <0.12.1 (fixed)) - Verified: https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-qwgh-2vcv-g2f7 (GitHub-reviewed advisory GHSA-qwgh-2vcv-g2f7 lists affected ranges: crates.io block_buffer >=0 <0.12.1) - Verified: https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-qwgh-2vcv-g2f7 (GitHub-reviewed advisory GHSA-qwgh-2vcv-g2f7 lists affected ranges: crates.io block_buffer >=0.11.0 <0.12.1) - Verified: https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GHSA-qwgh-2vcv-g2f7 (OSV record GHSA-qwgh-2vcv-g2f7 lists affected ranges: crates.io block_buffer >=0.11.0 <0.12.1 (fixed)) Commands are suggestions: review each one before running it.
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