Possible bypass of token claim validation when OAuth2 Introspection caching is enabled

Exploitation

No confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next marks exploitation only from CISA KEV.

CVSS

7.5 · CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N

EPSS

No dated EPSS signal available.

As published by the source; long descriptions are shortened.

Impact When you make a request to an endpoint that requires the scope foo using an access token granted with that foo scope, introspection will be valid and that token will be cached. The problem comes when a second requests to an endpoint that requires the scope bar is made before the cache has expired. Whether the token is granted or not to the bar scope, introspection will be valid. Patches A patch will be released with v0.38.12-beta.1. Workarounds Per default, caching is disabled for the oauth2introspection authenticator. When caching is disabled, this vulnerability does not exist. Trace The cache is checked in func (a AuthenticatorOAuth2Introspection) Authenticate(...). From tokenFromCache() it seems that it only validates the token expiration date, but ignores whether the token has or not the proper scopes. Post-Mortem The vulnerability was introduced in PR #424. During review, we failed to require appropriate test coverage by the submitter which is the primary reason that the…

Published by the source

23 Jun 2021, 18:00 UTC

Last modified by the source

9 Jan 2023, 05:05 UTC

Source last checked

26 Oct 2026, 14:54 UTC

1. Revision 1 · created · 26 Oct 2026

   Published from ghsa record GHSA-qvp4-rpmr-xwrr

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# Patch Next advisory brief: GHSA-qvp4-rpmr-xwrr

Advisory: Possible bypass of token claim validation when OAuth2 Introspection caching is enabled
IDs: GHSA-qvp4-rpmr-xwrr
Record: https://patchnext.com/advisories/ghsa-qvp4-rpmr-xwrr (revision 1, source checked 26 Oct 2026, 14:54 UTC)
Inventory: none attached. This brief comes from a public page and does not say whether any deployment is affected.
Severity: High (CVSS 7.5)
Exploitation: no confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next confirms exploitation only from CISA KEV.
Vendor response: Vendor fix available; fixed versions by package: github.com/ory/oathkeeper 0.38.12-beta.1. A vendor fix does not mean a deployment is fixed.

## Affected components
- Go github.com/ory/oathkeeper: affected >= 0.38.0-beta.2, <= 0.38.11-beta.1; fixed in 0.38.12-beta.1

## Suggested inspection (read-only)
- Go github.com/ory/oathkeeper: check the installed version with your package manager.

## Supported action
Upgrade each affected component to a fixed version on its release line. For a transitive dependency, upgrade the parent package or add an override or constraint, then regenerate the lockfile. Redeploy every environment that ran an affected version.

## Required regression checks
- Run the test suite and a production build.
- Exercise the features that depend on github.com/ory/oathkeeper.
- Repeat the inspection and confirm that only fixed versions remain installed.

## Rollback considerations
- Keep the previous lockfile and deployment artifact. Rolling back reinstates the vulnerable version, so apply any documented mitigation while you fix forward.

## Unresolved questions
- Which deployments run an affected version?
- Exploitation status can change. Check again before lowering the priority.
- Mark the work resolved only after the fixed version is verified in production.

## Sources
- Verified: https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-qvp4-rpmr-xwrr (GitHub-reviewed advisory GHSA-qvp4-rpmr-xwrr lists affected ranges: Go github.com/ory/oathkeeper >=0.38.0-beta.2 <=0.38.11-beta.1)

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