Mithril snapshots for Cardano database could be compromised by an adversary

Exploitation

No confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next marks exploitation only from CISA KEV.

CVSS

4.9 · CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:N/I:L/A:L

EPSS

No dated EPSS signal available.

As published by the source; long descriptions are shortened.

Impact Mithril certification of Cardano database The Mithril network provides certification for snapshots of the Cardano database, enabling users to quickly bootstrap a Cardano node without relying on the slower peer-to-peer synchronization process. To generate a multi-signature, a minimum threshold of Cardano stake registered in the protocol must agree on signing the same message. In this context, a digest is computed from the internal files of the Cardano node's database. However, this mechanism has certain limitations. Specifically, some files are not identically generated across all Cardano nodes, and there is no API to provide consistent snapshots at a specific beacon on the Cardano chain: - All immutable files, except the last one (which is still being created), are used to compute the message - The last immutable file is excluded from the signature - The ledger state files are also excluded from the signature. Cardano node startup sequence A Cardano node can only perform a…

Published by the source

7 May 2025, 15:25 UTC

Last modified by the source

7 May 2025, 15:25 UTC

Source last checked

26 Oct 2026, 15:38 UTC

1. Revision 1 · created · 26 Oct 2026

   Published from ghsa record GHSA-qv97-5qr8-2266

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# Patch Next advisory brief: GHSA-qv97-5qr8-2266

Advisory: Mithril snapshots for Cardano database could be compromised by an adversary
IDs: GHSA-qv97-5qr8-2266
Record: https://patchnext.com/advisories/ghsa-qv97-5qr8-2266 (revision 1, source checked 26 Oct 2026, 15:38 UTC)
Inventory: none attached. This brief comes from a public page and does not say whether any deployment is affected.
Severity: Medium (CVSS 4.9)
Exploitation: no confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next confirms exploitation only from CISA KEV.
Vendor response: Vendor fix available; fixed versions by package: mithril-client 0.12.2. A vendor fix does not mean a deployment is fixed.

## Affected components
- crates.io mithril-client: affected < 0.12.2; fixed in 0.12.2

## Suggested inspection (read-only)
- crates.io mithril-client: check the installed version with your package manager.

## Supported action
Upgrade each affected component to a fixed version on its release line. For a transitive dependency, upgrade the parent package or add an override or constraint, then regenerate the lockfile. Redeploy every environment that ran an affected version.

## Required regression checks
- Run the test suite and a production build.
- Exercise the features that depend on mithril-client.
- Repeat the inspection and confirm that only fixed versions remain installed.

## Rollback considerations
- Keep the previous lockfile and deployment artifact. Rolling back reinstates the vulnerable version, so apply any documented mitigation while you fix forward.

## Unresolved questions
- Which deployments run an affected version?
- Exploitation status can change. Check again before lowering the priority.
- Mark the work resolved only after the fixed version is verified in production.

## Sources
- Verified: https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-qv97-5qr8-2266 (GitHub-reviewed advisory GHSA-qv97-5qr8-2266 lists affected ranges: crates.io mithril-client >=0 <0.12.2)

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