http4k: BasicCookieStorage` (renamed `InsecureCookieStorage`) did not enforce RFC 6265 cookie scoping; new `DefaultCookieStorage` is now the default
What to do
Vendor fix available. Upgrade each affected package to the fixed version on its release line (org.http4k:http4k-core 6.48.0.0, 5.42.0.0, 4.51.0.0), redeploy, then verify what is actually installed.
This page has no inventory attached, so it cannot say whether you are affected. A vendor fix is not proof that your deployment is fixed.
Affected packages
Maven org.http4k:http4k-core
- Affected
- >= 6.0.0.0, < 6.48.0.0>= 5.0.0.0, < 5.42.0.0< 4.51.0.0
- Fixed in
- 6.48.0.0, 5.42.0.0, 4.51.0.0
Sources
- GitHub Advisory Database and maintainer security advisories on GitHub
GitHub-reviewed advisory GHSA-pr33-38xx-6r26 lists affected ranges: Maven org.http4k:http4k-core >=6.0.0.0 =5.0.0.0 =0 <4.51.0.0
VerifiedObserved Structured GitHub Advisory Database record (type=reviewed) from the GitHub REST API.
Severity and exploitation
- Exploitation
- No confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next marks exploitation only from CISA KEV.
- CVSS 4.0
- 6.9 · CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N · score source
- EPSS
- No dated EPSS signal available.
Source description
As published by the source; long descriptions are shortened.
Impact The previous BasicCookieStorage did not enforce RFC 6265 scoping rules around cookie domain, path, and Secure attribute. A client using a single storage instance to talk to multiple origins could have cookies leak across domains, or have Secure cookies sent over plain HTTP — the deprecation message states it bluntly: "BasicCookieStorage has no domain/path/scheme scoping and leaks cookies across origins. Use DefaultCookieStorage instead." Who is affected: any client using BasicCookieStorage directly with cookies for more than one origin or scheme. Single-origin uses are unaffected. Patches | Line | Fixed in | Edition | |------|----------|---------| | v6.x (Community) | 6.48.0.0 | Community | | v5.x (LTS) | 5.42.0.0 | Enterprise — contact enterprise@http4k.org | | v4.x (LTS) | 4.51.0.0 | Enterprise — contact enterprise@http4k.org | The fix introduces DefaultCookieStorage (RFC 6265 compliant) as the drop-in default; BasicCookieStorage is renamed InsecureCookieStorage and remains…
Dates and revisions
- Published by the source
- Last modified by the source
- Source last checked
- Revision 1 · created ·
Published from ghsa record GHSA-pr33-38xx-6r26
Agent brief
Preview the exact text before you copy it. Commands are read-only suggestions; review them before running anything.
# Patch Next advisory brief: GHSA-pr33-38xx-6r26 Advisory: http4k: BasicCookieStorage` (renamed `InsecureCookieStorage`) did not enforce RFC 6265 cookie scoping; new `DefaultCookieStorage` is now the default IDs: GHSA-pr33-38xx-6r26 Record: https://patchnext.com/advisories/ghsa-pr33-38xx-6r26 (revision 1, source checked 26 Oct 2026, 16:53 UTC) Inventory: none attached. This brief comes from a public page and does not say whether any deployment is affected. Severity: Medium (CVSS 6.9) Exploitation: no confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next confirms exploitation only from CISA KEV. Vendor response: Vendor fix available; fixed versions by package: org.http4k:http4k-core 6.48.0.0, 5.42.0.0, 4.51.0.0. A vendor fix does not mean a deployment is fixed. ## Affected components - Maven org.http4k:http4k-core: affected >= 6.0.0.0, < 6.48.0.0; >= 5.0.0.0, < 5.42.0.0; < 4.51.0.0; fixed in 6.48.0.0, 5.42.0.0, 4.51.0.0 ## Suggested inspection (read-only) - Maven org.http4k:http4k-core: check the installed version with your package manager. ## Supported action Upgrade each affected component to a fixed version on its release line. For a transitive dependency, upgrade the parent package or add an override or constraint, then regenerate the lockfile. Redeploy every environment that ran an affected version. ## Required regression checks - Run the test suite and a production build. - Exercise the features that depend on org.http4k:http4k-core. - Repeat the inspection and confirm that only fixed versions remain installed. ## Rollback considerations - Keep the previous lockfile and deployment artifact. Rolling back reinstates the vulnerable version, so apply any documented mitigation while you fix forward. ## Unresolved questions - Which deployments run an affected version? - Exploitation status can change. Check again before lowering the priority. - Mark the work resolved only after the fixed version is verified in production. ## Sources - Verified: https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-pr33-38xx-6r26 (GitHub-reviewed advisory GHSA-pr33-38xx-6r26 lists affected ranges: Maven org.http4k:http4k-core >=6.0.0.0 =5.0.0.0 =0 <4.51.0.0) Commands are suggestions: review each one before running it.
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