Trigger.dev: Missing Authentication in Run Replay Action Allows Cross-Organization Task Execution (IDOR)
What to do
Vendor fix available. Upgrade each affected package to the fixed version on its release line (trigger.dev 4.5.2), redeploy, then verify what is actually installed.
This page has no inventory attached, so it cannot say whether you are affected. A vendor fix is not proof that your deployment is fixed.
Affected packages
npm trigger.dev
- Affected
- <= 4.5.1
- Fixed in
- 4.5.2
Sources
- GitHub Advisory Database and maintainer security advisories on GitHub
GitHub-reviewed advisory GHSA-pp95-gc86-jq6q lists affected ranges: npm trigger.dev >=0 <=4.5.1
VerifiedObserved Structured GitHub Advisory Database record (type=reviewed) from the GitHub REST API.
- Open Source Vulnerabilities (OSV.dev), including the GitHub Advisory Database
OSV record GHSA-pp95-gc86-jq6q lists affected ranges: npm trigger.dev >=0 <4.5.2 (fixed)
VerifiedObserved Structured OSV record; GitHub-reviewed advisory.
Severity and exploitation
- Exploitation
- No confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next marks exploitation only from CISA KEV.
- CVSS
- 7.1 · CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:H/A:N
- EPSS
- No dated EPSS signal available.
Source description
As published by the source; long descriptions are shortened.
Summary The run replay action function at apps/webapp/app/routes/resources.taskruns.$runParam.replay.ts has no authentication or authorization check. While the loader (GET) in the same file properly calls requireUser(request) and scopes queries to the user's organizations, the action (POST) at line 166 does neither — allowing any authenticated user to replay task runs from any organization by knowing the run's friendlyId. Details Vulnerable file: apps/webapp/app/routes/resources.taskruns.$runParam.replay.ts The loader (line 28-29) — properly authenticated: The action (line 166-193) — NO authentication: The Prisma query at line 177 fetches the run by friendlyId only — no userId or organization filter. The ReplayTaskRunService then creates a new task run in the victim's environment, executing with the victim's environment variables and secrets. Same bug class exists in: apps/webapp/app/routes/resources.batches.$batchId.check-completion.ts (line 17) — the action has zero authentication,…
Dates and revisions
- Published by the source
- Last modified by the source
- Source last checked
- Revision 3 · amended ·
Amended from ghsa record GHSA-pp95-gc86-jq6q
- Revision 2 · amended ·
Amended from osv record GHSA-pp95-gc86-jq6q
- Revision 1 · created ·
Published from ghsa record GHSA-pp95-gc86-jq6q
Agent brief
Preview the exact text before you copy it. Commands are read-only suggestions; review them before running anything.
# Patch Next advisory brief: GHSA-pp95-gc86-jq6q Advisory: Trigger.dev: Missing Authentication in Run Replay Action Allows Cross-Organization Task Execution (IDOR) IDs: GHSA-pp95-gc86-jq6q Record: https://patchnext.com/advisories/ghsa-pp95-gc86-jq6q (revision 3, source checked 26 Oct 2026, 13:06 UTC) Inventory: none attached. This brief comes from a public page and does not say whether any deployment is affected. Severity: High (CVSS 7.1) Exploitation: no confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next confirms exploitation only from CISA KEV. Vendor response: Vendor fix available; fixed versions by package: trigger.dev 4.5.2. A vendor fix does not mean a deployment is fixed. ## Affected components - npm trigger.dev: affected <= 4.5.1; fixed in 4.5.2 ## Suggested inspection (read-only) - `npm ls trigger.dev --all`: lists every installed copy and version, including transitive ones. Run in the project root after `npm ci`. ## Supported action Upgrade each affected component to a fixed version on its release line. For a transitive dependency, upgrade the parent package or add an override or constraint, then regenerate the lockfile. Redeploy every environment that ran an affected version. ## Required regression checks - Run the test suite and a production build. - Exercise the features that depend on trigger.dev. - Repeat the inspection and confirm that only fixed versions remain installed. ## Rollback considerations - Keep the previous lockfile and deployment artifact. Rolling back reinstates the vulnerable version, so apply any documented mitigation while you fix forward. ## Unresolved questions - Which deployments run an affected version? - Exploitation status can change. Check again before lowering the priority. - Mark the work resolved only after the fixed version is verified in production. ## Sources - Verified: https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-pp95-gc86-jq6q (GitHub-reviewed advisory GHSA-pp95-gc86-jq6q lists affected ranges: npm trigger.dev >=0 <=4.5.1) - Verified: https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GHSA-pp95-gc86-jq6q (OSV record GHSA-pp95-gc86-jq6q lists affected ranges: npm trigger.dev >=0 <4.5.2 (fixed)) Commands are suggestions: review each one before running it.
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