Soroban: Muxed address ScVal conversions may break after a conversion failure

Exploitation

No confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next marks exploitation only from CISA KEV.

CVSS 4.0

1.7 · CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:U · score source

EPSS

No dated EPSS signal available.

As published by the source; long descriptions are shortened.

Summary Soroban host ensures that MuxedAddress objects can't be used as storage keys in order to proactively prevent the contract logic bugs. However, due to a bug in Soroban host implementation, a failure in Val-ScVal conversion during the storage key computation will have the flag indicating that storage conversion is happening stuck in the true state until the next storage access. While the flag is stuck in true state, any MuxedAddress object conversions to ScVal will fail, i.e. a failure will occur if a MuxedAddress is emitted in the event or is serialized to XDR via a host function. Impact The bug may cause unexpected contract failures in the rare edge case scenarios. In the worst case scenario the whole transaction will fail and the changes will be rolled back. Because the contract call is simply rolled back, there is no risk of the state corruption. An example scenario that would be affected by the bug is as follows: - Contract A calls contract B via trycall - Contract B calls…

Published by the source

7 Mar 2026, 02:39 UTC

Last modified by the source

7 Mar 2026, 02:39 UTC

Source last checked

26 Oct 2026, 15:42 UTC

1. Revision 1 · created · 26 Oct 2026

   Published from ghsa record GHSA-pm4j-7r4q-ccg8

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# Patch Next advisory brief: GHSA-pm4j-7r4q-ccg8

Advisory: Soroban: Muxed address ScVal conversions may break after a conversion failure
IDs: GHSA-pm4j-7r4q-ccg8
Record: https://patchnext.com/advisories/ghsa-pm4j-7r4q-ccg8 (revision 1, source checked 26 Oct 2026, 15:42 UTC)
Inventory: none attached. This brief comes from a public page and does not say whether any deployment is affected.
Severity: Low (CVSS 1.7)
Exploitation: no confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next confirms exploitation only from CISA KEV.
Vendor response: Vendor fix available; fixed versions by package: soroban-env-host 26.0.0. A vendor fix does not mean a deployment is fixed.

## Affected components
- crates.io soroban-env-host: affected < 26.0.0; fixed in 26.0.0

## Suggested inspection (read-only)
- crates.io soroban-env-host: check the installed version with your package manager.

## Supported action
Upgrade each affected component to a fixed version on its release line. For a transitive dependency, upgrade the parent package or add an override or constraint, then regenerate the lockfile. Redeploy every environment that ran an affected version.

## Required regression checks
- Run the test suite and a production build.
- Exercise the features that depend on soroban-env-host.
- Repeat the inspection and confirm that only fixed versions remain installed.

## Rollback considerations
- Keep the previous lockfile and deployment artifact. Rolling back reinstates the vulnerable version, so apply any documented mitigation while you fix forward.

## Unresolved questions
- Which deployments run an affected version?
- Exploitation status can change. Check again before lowering the priority.
- Mark the work resolved only after the fixed version is verified in production.

## Sources
- Verified: https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-pm4j-7r4q-ccg8 (GitHub-reviewed advisory GHSA-pm4j-7r4q-ccg8 lists affected ranges: crates.io soroban-env-host >=0 <26.0.0)

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