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Medium, CVSS 4.3amended

Paperclip: Approval decision attribution spoofing via client-controlled decidedByUserId in paperclip server

GHSA-p7mm-r948-4q3q

What to do

Vendor fix available. Upgrade each affected package to the fixed version on its release line (@paperclipai/server 2026.416.0), redeploy, then verify what is actually installed.

This page has no inventory attached, so it cannot say whether you are affected. A vendor fix is not proof that your deployment is fixed.

Affected packages

Sources

Severity and exploitation
Exploitation
No confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next marks exploitation only from CISA KEV.
CVSS
4.3 · CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N
EPSS
No dated EPSS signal available.
Source description

As published by the source; long descriptions are shortened.

Summary The approval-resolution endpoints (POST /approvals/:id/approve, /reject, /request-revision) accept a client-supplied decidedByUserId field in the request body and write it verbatim into the authoritative approvals.decidedByUserId column — without cross-checking it against the authenticated actor. Any board user who can access an approval's company can record the decision as having been made by another user (e.g. the CEO), forging the governance audit trail. For hireagent approvals with a monthly budget, the same attacker-controlled string is also stamped onto the resulting budgetpolicies row as createdByUserId/updatedByUserId. Details Entry point — server/src/routes/approvals.ts:130: Authorization check — server/src/routes/authz.ts:4: assertBoard only checks that the caller is some board user; it never ties req.body.decidedByUserId to req.actor.userId. requireApprovalAccess/assertCompanyAccess only verify the attacker is allowed to touch the approval's company, which every…

Dates and revisions
Published by the source
Last modified by the source
Source last checked
  1. Revision 2 · amended ·

    Amended from ghsa record GHSA-p7mm-r948-4q3q

  2. Revision 1 · created ·

    Published from osv record GHSA-p7mm-r948-4q3q

Agent brief

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# Patch Next advisory brief: GHSA-p7mm-r948-4q3q

Advisory: Paperclip: Approval decision attribution spoofing via client-controlled `decidedByUserId` in paperclip server
IDs: GHSA-p7mm-r948-4q3q
Record: https://patchnext.com/advisories/ghsa-p7mm-r948-4q3q (revision 2, source checked 26 Oct 2026, 12:48 UTC)
Inventory: none attached. This brief comes from a public page and does not say whether any deployment is affected.
Severity: Medium (CVSS 4.3)
Exploitation: no confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next confirms exploitation only from CISA KEV.
Vendor response: Vendor fix available; fixed versions by package: @paperclipai/server 2026.416.0. A vendor fix does not mean a deployment is fixed.

## Affected components
- npm @paperclipai/server: affected < 2026.416.0; fixed in 2026.416.0

## Suggested inspection (read-only)
- `npm ls @paperclipai/server --all`: lists every installed copy and version, including transitive ones. Run in the project root after `npm ci`.

## Supported action
Upgrade each affected component to a fixed version on its release line. For a transitive dependency, upgrade the parent package or add an override or constraint, then regenerate the lockfile. Redeploy every environment that ran an affected version.

## Required regression checks
- Run the test suite and a production build.
- Exercise the features that depend on @paperclipai/server.
- Repeat the inspection and confirm that only fixed versions remain installed.

## Rollback considerations
- Keep the previous lockfile and deployment artifact. Rolling back reinstates the vulnerable version, so apply any documented mitigation while you fix forward.

## Unresolved questions
- Which deployments run an affected version?
- Exploitation status can change. Check again before lowering the priority.
- Mark the work resolved only after the fixed version is verified in production.

## Sources
- Verified: https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GHSA-p7mm-r948-4q3q (OSV record GHSA-p7mm-r948-4q3q lists affected ranges: npm @paperclipai/server >=0 <2026.416.0 (fixed))
- Verified: https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-p7mm-r948-4q3q (GitHub-reviewed advisory GHSA-p7mm-r948-4q3q lists affected ranges: npm @paperclipai/server >=0 <2026.416.0)

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