gix's submodule name validation bypass + trust inheritance flaw enables path traversal and credential disclosure
What to do
Vendor fix available. Upgrade each affected package to the fixed version on its release line (gix 0.83.0; gix-validate 0.11.1), redeploy, then verify what is actually installed.
This page has no inventory attached, so it cannot say whether you are affected. A vendor fix is not proof that your deployment is fixed.
Affected packages
crates.io gix
- Affected
- < 0.83.0
- Fixed in
- 0.83.0
crates.io gix-validate
- Affected
- <= 0.10.0
- Fixed in
- 0.11.1
Sources
- GitHub Advisory Database and maintainer security advisories on GitHub
GitHub-reviewed advisory GHSA-p3hw-mv63-rf9w lists affected ranges: crates.io gix >=0 =0 <=0.10.0
VerifiedObserved Structured GitHub Advisory Database record (type=reviewed) from the GitHub REST API.
Severity and exploitation
- Exploitation
- No confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next marks exploitation only from CISA KEV.
- CVSS 4.0
- 7.5 · CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:A/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N · score source
- EPSS
- No dated EPSS signal available.
Source description
As published by the source; long descriptions are shortened.
Summary Submodule name validation bypass plus missing validation in production code paths allows path traversal via crafted .gitmodules. Combined with a trust inheritance flaw in Submodule::open(), this enables reading arbitrary git repository configs (including credentials) from traversed paths with full trust (CWE-22, CWE-200). Details Bug 1: Validation bypass in gix-validate/src/submodule.rs (lines 27-42) The name() function uses name.find(b"..") which returns only the FIRST occurrence. If the first .. is embedded in a non-traversal context, the function returns Ok without checking subsequent ../ sequences: Bypass: a..b/../../../.git/ passes because find(b"..") returns position 1 (the .. in a..b), checks name[3] == b'b', and returns Ok. The real /../../../ is never checked. Bug 2: Validation never called in production gixvalidate::submodule::name() has zero production callers (only test code). The names() iterator in gix-submodule/src/access.rs:29 explicitly documents it returns…
Dates and revisions
- Published by the source
- Last modified by the source
- Source last checked
- Revision 1 · created ·
Published from ghsa record GHSA-p3hw-mv63-rf9w
Agent brief
Preview the exact text before you copy it. Commands are read-only suggestions; review them before running anything.
# Patch Next advisory brief: GHSA-p3hw-mv63-rf9w Advisory: gix's submodule name validation bypass + trust inheritance flaw enables path traversal and credential disclosure IDs: GHSA-p3hw-mv63-rf9w Record: https://patchnext.com/advisories/ghsa-p3hw-mv63-rf9w (revision 1, source checked 26 Oct 2026, 15:42 UTC) Inventory: none attached. This brief comes from a public page and does not say whether any deployment is affected. Severity: High (CVSS 7.5) Exploitation: no confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next confirms exploitation only from CISA KEV. Vendor response: Vendor fix available; fixed versions by package: gix 0.83.0; gix-validate 0.11.1. A vendor fix does not mean a deployment is fixed. ## Affected components - crates.io gix: affected < 0.83.0; fixed in 0.83.0 - crates.io gix-validate: affected <= 0.10.0; fixed in 0.11.1 ## Suggested inspection (read-only) - crates.io gix: check the installed version with your package manager. - crates.io gix-validate: check the installed version with your package manager. ## Supported action Upgrade each affected component to a fixed version on its release line. For a transitive dependency, upgrade the parent package or add an override or constraint, then regenerate the lockfile. Redeploy every environment that ran an affected version. ## Required regression checks - Run the test suite and a production build. - Exercise the features that depend on gix, gix-validate. - Repeat the inspection and confirm that only fixed versions remain installed. ## Rollback considerations - Keep the previous lockfile and deployment artifact. Rolling back reinstates the vulnerable version, so apply any documented mitigation while you fix forward. ## Unresolved questions - Which deployments run an affected version? - Exploitation status can change. Check again before lowering the priority. - Mark the work resolved only after the fixed version is verified in production. ## Sources - Verified: https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-p3hw-mv63-rf9w (GitHub-reviewed advisory GHSA-p3hw-mv63-rf9w lists affected ranges: crates.io gix >=0 =0 <=0.10.0) Commands are suggestions: review each one before running it.
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