Budibase: Unauthenticated REST Datasource Credential Theft via Cross-Origin Auth Leak
CVE-2026-73407GHSA-mqhr-6j6h-74p5
What to do
Vendor response not established. Follow the primary source's mitigation guidance and check back for a fix.
This page has no inventory attached, so it cannot say whether you are affected. A vendor fix is not proof that your deployment is fixed.
Affected packages
npm @budibase/server
- Affected
- <= 3.38.1
- Fixed in
- no fixed version recorded
Sources
- GitHub Advisory Database and maintainer security advisories on GitHub
GitHub-reviewed advisory GHSA-mqhr-6j6h-74p5 lists affected ranges: npm @budibase/server >=0 <=3.38.1
VerifiedObserved Structured GitHub Advisory Database record (type=reviewed) from the GitHub REST API.
- Open Source Vulnerabilities (OSV.dev), including the GitHub Advisory Database
OSV record GHSA-mqhr-6j6h-74p5 lists affected ranges: npm @budibase/server >=0 <=3.38.1
VerifiedObserved Structured OSV record; GitHub-reviewed advisory.
Severity and exploitation
- Exploitation
- No confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next marks exploitation only from CISA KEV.
- CVSS
- not scored
- EPSS
- CVE-2026-73407: 0.54% estimated exploitation activity in the next 30 days; percentile 45.48 (FIRST EPSS, 2026-11-03). This is a model estimate, not proof of exploitation or customer exposure.
Source description
As published by the source; long descriptions are shortened.
Summary Budibase attaches a REST datasource's stored credentials (Bearer/Basic tokens and static headers) to an outgoing request before it decides which host the request goes to, and never checks that the destination host matches the datasource. A query's request path can be pointed at any host (via an absolute URL or a user-supplied {{ parameter }}), so the stored credentials are delivered to an attacker-chosen server. Because a query can be published with the PUBLIC role, this is reachable by a fully unauthenticated attacker with one HTTP request. The credentials are masked (--secret-value--) everywhere in the API, yet this recovers them in cleartext. This is a bypass of GHSA-3gp5 (which fixed the base-URL rewrite vector but added no same-origin check; the query-path vector remains, now unauthenticated). Root Cause packages/server/src/integrations/rest.ts: req() builds authHeaders = getAuthHeaders(...) from the stored auth configs and merges them with config.defaultHeaders into…
Dates and revisions
- Published by the source
- Last modified by the source
- Source last checked
- Revision 3 · amended ·
Amended from ghsa record GHSA-mqhr-6j6h-74p5
- Revision 2 · amended ·
Amended from osv record GHSA-mqhr-6j6h-74p5
- Revision 1 · created ·
Published from ghsa record GHSA-mqhr-6j6h-74p5
Agent brief
Preview the exact text before you copy it. Commands are read-only suggestions; review them before running anything.
# Patch Next advisory brief: CVE-2026-73407 Advisory: Budibase: Unauthenticated REST Datasource Credential Theft via Cross-Origin Auth Leak IDs: CVE-2026-73407, GHSA-mqhr-6j6h-74p5 Record: https://patchnext.com/advisories/ghsa-mqhr-6j6h-74p5 (revision 3, source checked 26 Oct 2026, 12:58 UTC) Inventory: none attached. This brief comes from a public page and does not say whether any deployment is affected. Severity: Unrated Exploitation: no confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next confirms exploitation only from CISA KEV. Vendor response: Vendor response not established. A vendor fix does not mean a deployment is fixed. ## Affected components - npm @budibase/server: affected <= 3.38.1 ## Suggested inspection (read-only) - `npm ls @budibase/server --all`: lists every installed copy and version, including transitive ones. Run in the project root after `npm ci`. ## Supported action No complete vendor fix is recorded. Follow the primary source's mitigation guidance and check this record again before closing anything. ## Required regression checks - Run the test suite and a production build. - Exercise the features that depend on @budibase/server. - Repeat the inspection and confirm that only fixed versions remain installed. ## Rollback considerations - Keep the previous lockfile and deployment artifact. Rolling back reinstates the vulnerable version, so apply any documented mitigation while you fix forward. ## Unresolved questions - Which deployments run an affected version? - Exploitation status can change. Check again before lowering the priority. - Mark the work resolved only after the fixed version is verified in production. ## Sources - Verified: https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-mqhr-6j6h-74p5 (GitHub-reviewed advisory GHSA-mqhr-6j6h-74p5 lists affected ranges: npm @budibase/server >=0 <=3.38.1) - Verified: https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GHSA-mqhr-6j6h-74p5 (OSV record GHSA-mqhr-6j6h-74p5 lists affected ranges: npm @budibase/server >=0 <=3.38.1) Commands are suggestions: review each one before running it.
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