Sharks has a Bias of Polynomial Coefficients in Secret Sharing
What to do
Vendor response not established. Follow the primary source's mitigation guidance and check back for a fix.
This page has no inventory attached, so it cannot say whether you are affected. A vendor fix is not proof that your deployment is fixed.
Affected packages
crates.io sharks
- Affected
- <= 0.5.0
- Fixed in
- no fixed version recorded
Sources
- GitHub Advisory Database and maintainer security advisories on GitHub
GitHub-reviewed advisory GHSA-jp37-5qhw-mffw lists affected ranges: crates.io sharks >=0 <=0.5.0
VerifiedObserved Structured GitHub Advisory Database record (type=reviewed) from the GitHub REST API.
Severity and exploitation
- Exploitation
- No confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next marks exploitation only from CISA KEV.
- CVSS 4.0
- 6.0 · CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:N/PR:N/UI:P/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N · score source
- EPSS
- No dated EPSS signal available.
Source description
As published by the source; long descriptions are shortened.
Affected versions of this crate allowed for a bias when generating random polynomials for Shamir Secret Sharing, where instead of being within the range [0, 255] they were instead in the range [1, 255]. A description from Cure53, who originally found the issue, is available: The correct method to select a random polynomial would be to select all coefficients (including the most significant coefficient) uniformly in the range 0..255 (inclusive). Otherwise, knowledge that a coefficient in a polynomial cannot be 0 permits the exclusion of single byte values for the shared secret given one share less than required. [...] Exploiting this weakness necessitates sharing the same secret multiple times. In this scenario, an attacker could exclude an exponential number of values for each of the shared bytes until sufficiently few values remain for brute forcing. Cure53 estimates that under ideal circumstances (e.g., a 2-out-of-N scheme) a shared secret can be reconstructed if the same secret…
Dates and revisions
- Published by the source
- Last modified by the source
- Source last checked
- Revision 1 · created ·
Published from ghsa record GHSA-jp37-5qhw-mffw
Agent brief
Preview the exact text before you copy it. Commands are read-only suggestions; review them before running anything.
# Patch Next advisory brief: GHSA-jp37-5qhw-mffw Advisory: Sharks has a Bias of Polynomial Coefficients in Secret Sharing IDs: GHSA-jp37-5qhw-mffw Record: https://patchnext.com/advisories/ghsa-jp37-5qhw-mffw (revision 1, source checked 26 Oct 2026, 15:38 UTC) Inventory: none attached. This brief comes from a public page and does not say whether any deployment is affected. Severity: Medium (CVSS 6.0) Exploitation: no confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next confirms exploitation only from CISA KEV. Vendor response: Vendor response not established. A vendor fix does not mean a deployment is fixed. ## Affected components - crates.io sharks: affected <= 0.5.0 ## Suggested inspection (read-only) - crates.io sharks: check the installed version with your package manager. ## Supported action No complete vendor fix is recorded. Follow the primary source's mitigation guidance and check this record again before closing anything. ## Required regression checks - Run the test suite and a production build. - Exercise the features that depend on sharks. - Repeat the inspection and confirm that only fixed versions remain installed. ## Rollback considerations - Keep the previous lockfile and deployment artifact. Rolling back reinstates the vulnerable version, so apply any documented mitigation while you fix forward. ## Unresolved questions - Which deployments run an affected version? - Exploitation status can change. Check again before lowering the priority. - Mark the work resolved only after the fixed version is verified in production. ## Sources - Verified: https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-jp37-5qhw-mffw (GitHub-reviewed advisory GHSA-jp37-5qhw-mffw lists affected ranges: crates.io sharks >=0 <=0.5.0) Commands are suggestions: review each one before running it.
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