in-toto: PGP trust model not (fully) considered

Exploitation

No confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next marks exploitation only from CISA KEV.

CVSS

not scored

EPSS

No dated EPSS signal available.

As published by the source; long descriptions are shortened.

Impact This security advisory lists multiple concerns about how in-toto uses PGP keys. The findings are aggregated here, because they are all eligible to the same mitigation strategy. Note that the findings are rated with different severities (see inline) and the highest score was chosen for this advisory: - PGP Key Creation Time Not Validated (severity: low) in-toto does not check, if the validity period of a PGP Key (starting with the key creation time) is in the future, when copying the key from GnuPG to a layout, or when verifying signatures. A validity period in the future is usually a sign of a wrong system clock, meaning it can’t be trusted for verifying the validity period. A MITM attacker who is able to manipulate delivered software products might also be able to control the system time by manipulating NTP. In a scenario where an attacker gained control over two expired subkeys with no overlapping validity period, the attacker could set the system time to a time before the…

Published by the source

11 May 2023, 20:48 UTC

Last modified by the source

30 Nov 2024, 05:49 UTC

Source last checked

26 Oct 2026, 13:11 UTC

1. Revision 2 · amended · 26 Oct 2026

   Amended from ghsa record GHSA-jjgp-whrp-gq8m

2. Revision 1 · created · 24 Oct 2026

   Published from osv record GHSA-jjgp-whrp-gq8m

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# Patch Next advisory brief: GHSA-jjgp-whrp-gq8m

Advisory: in-toto: PGP trust model not (fully) considered
IDs: GHSA-jjgp-whrp-gq8m
Record: https://patchnext.com/advisories/ghsa-jjgp-whrp-gq8m (revision 2, source checked 26 Oct 2026, 13:11 UTC)
Inventory: none attached. This brief comes from a public page and does not say whether any deployment is affected.
Severity: Unrated
Exploitation: no confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next confirms exploitation only from CISA KEV.
Vendor response: Vendor response not established. A vendor fix does not mean a deployment is fixed.

## Affected components
- PyPI in-toto: affected <= 1.4.0

## Suggested inspection (read-only)
- `python -m pip show in-toto`: prints the installed version. Run with the environment that serves production active.

## Supported action
No complete vendor fix is recorded. Follow the primary source's mitigation guidance and check this record again before closing anything.

## Required regression checks
- Run the test suite and a production build.
- Exercise the features that depend on in-toto.
- Repeat the inspection and confirm that only fixed versions remain installed.

## Rollback considerations
- Keep the previous lockfile and deployment artifact. Rolling back reinstates the vulnerable version, so apply any documented mitigation while you fix forward.

## Unresolved questions
- Which deployments run an affected version?
- Exploitation status can change. Check again before lowering the priority.
- Mark the work resolved only after the fixed version is verified in production.

## Sources
- Verified: https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GHSA-jjgp-whrp-gq8m (OSV record GHSA-jjgp-whrp-gq8m lists affected ranges: PyPI in-toto >=0 <=1.4.0)
- Verified: https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-jjgp-whrp-gq8m (GitHub-reviewed advisory GHSA-jjgp-whrp-gq8m lists affected ranges: PyPI in-toto >=0 <=1.4.0)

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