OpenClaw Hook Session Key Override Enables Targeted Cross-Session Routing

Exploitation

No confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next marks exploitation only from CISA KEV.

CVSS

7.1 · CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:H/A:N

EPSS

No dated EPSS signal available.

As published by the source; long descriptions are shortened.

Summary The issue is not deterministic session keys by itself. The exploitable path was accepting externally supplied sessionKey values on authenticated hook ingress, allowing a hook token holder to route messages into chosen sessions. Affected Behavior - POST /hooks/agent accepted payload sessionKey and used it directly for session routing. - Common session-key shapes (for example agent:main:dm:<peerId) were often derivable from known metadata, making targeted routing practical when request-level override was enabled. Attack Preconditions - Attacker can call hook endpoints with a valid hook token. - Hook ingress allows request-selected sessionKey values. - Target session keys can be derived or guessed. Without those preconditions, deterministic key formats alone do not provide access. Impact - Integrity: targeted message/prompt injection into chosen sessions. - Persistence: poisoned context can affect subsequent turns when the same session key is reused. - Confidentiality impact is…

Published by the source

17 Feb 2026, 16:43 UTC

Last modified by the source

17 Feb 2026, 17:02 UTC

Source last checked

26 Oct 2026, 12:42 UTC

1. Revision 2 · amended · 26 Oct 2026

   Amended from ghsa record GHSA-hv93-r4j3-q65f

2. Revision 1 · created · 24 Oct 2026

   Published from osv record GHSA-hv93-r4j3-q65f

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# Patch Next advisory brief: GHSA-hv93-r4j3-q65f

Advisory: OpenClaw Hook Session Key Override Enables Targeted Cross-Session Routing
IDs: GHSA-hv93-r4j3-q65f
Record: https://patchnext.com/advisories/ghsa-hv93-r4j3-q65f (revision 2, source checked 26 Oct 2026, 12:42 UTC)
Inventory: none attached. This brief comes from a public page and does not say whether any deployment is affected.
Severity: High (CVSS 7.1)
Exploitation: no confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next confirms exploitation only from CISA KEV.
Vendor response: Vendor fix available; fixed versions by package: openclaw 2026.2.12. A vendor fix does not mean a deployment is fixed.

## Affected components
- npm openclaw: affected >= 2.0.0-beta3, < 2026.2.12; fixed in 2026.2.12

## Suggested inspection (read-only)
- `npm ls openclaw --all`: lists every installed copy and version, including transitive ones. Run in the project root after `npm ci`.

## Supported action
Upgrade each affected component to a fixed version on its release line. For a transitive dependency, upgrade the parent package or add an override or constraint, then regenerate the lockfile. Redeploy every environment that ran an affected version.

## Required regression checks
- Run the test suite and a production build.
- Exercise the features that depend on openclaw.
- Repeat the inspection and confirm that only fixed versions remain installed.

## Rollback considerations
- Keep the previous lockfile and deployment artifact. Rolling back reinstates the vulnerable version, so apply any documented mitigation while you fix forward.

## Unresolved questions
- Which deployments run an affected version?
- Exploitation status can change. Check again before lowering the priority.
- Mark the work resolved only after the fixed version is verified in production.

## Sources
- Verified: https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GHSA-hv93-r4j3-q65f (OSV record GHSA-hv93-r4j3-q65f lists affected ranges: npm openclaw >=2.0.0-beta3 <2026.2.12 (fixed))
- Verified: https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-hv93-r4j3-q65f (GitHub-reviewed advisory GHSA-hv93-r4j3-q65f lists affected ranges: npm openclaw >=2.0.0-beta3 <2026.2.12)

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