FacturaScripts: Path traversal in UploadedFile::move() via getClientOriginalName() — arbitrary file write outside MyFiles/ leading to RCE
CVE-2026-77526GHSA-hgjx-r89m-m7v4
What to do
Vendor fix available. Upgrade each affected package to the fixed version on its release line (facturascripts/facturascripts 2026.3), redeploy, then verify what is actually installed.
This page has no inventory attached, so it cannot say whether you are affected. A vendor fix is not proof that your deployment is fixed.
Affected packages
Packagist facturascripts/facturascripts
- Affected
- >= 2025, < 2026.3
- Fixed in
- 2026.3
Sources
- GitHub Advisory Database and maintainer security advisories on GitHub
GitHub-reviewed advisory GHSA-hgjx-r89m-m7v4 lists affected ranges: Packagist facturascripts/facturascripts >=2025 <=2026.2
VerifiedObserved Structured GitHub Advisory Database record (type=reviewed) from the GitHub REST API.
- Open Source Vulnerabilities (OSV.dev), including the GitHub Advisory Database
OSV record GHSA-hgjx-r89m-m7v4 lists affected ranges: Packagist facturascripts/facturascripts >=2025 <2026.3 (fixed)
VerifiedObserved Structured OSV record; GitHub-reviewed advisory.
Severity and exploitation
- Exploitation
- No confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next marks exploitation only from CISA KEV.
- CVSS
- 9.9 · CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H
- EPSS
- No dated EPSS signal available.
Source description
As published by the source; long descriptions are shortened.
Summary `FacturaScripts\Core\UploadedFile::move($destiny, $destinyName)` concatenates `$destiny` and `$destinyName` without normalizing the resulting path. Every caller in the codebase passes `UploadedFile::getClientOriginalName()` — the unsanitized client-supplied filename — as `$destinyName`, so an authenticated user submitting a filename containing `../` segments can write the uploaded content to any directory writable by the web-server user, escaping the intended `MyFiles/` location. Because the shipped `htaccess-sample` (the documented production Apache configuration) excludes `Dinamic/Assets/` and `node_modules/` from the `index.php` rewrite, files written into those directories are served directly by Apache. Combined with `.htaccess` not being in `BLOCKED_EXTENSIONS`, the primitive escalates from arbitrary file write to remote code execution.
Vulnerable Code `Core/UploadedFile.php`: ```php private const BLOCKED_EXTENSIONS = 'phar', 'php', 'php3', 'php4', 'php5', 'php7',…
Dates and revisions
- Published by the source
- Last modified by the source
- Source last checked
- Revision 3 · amended ·
Amended from osv record GHSA-hgjx-r89m-m7v4
- Revision 2 · amended ·
Amended from ghsa record GHSA-hgjx-r89m-m7v4
- Revision 1 · created ·
Published from ghsa record GHSA-hgjx-r89m-m7v4
Agent brief
Preview the exact text before you copy it. Commands are read-only suggestions; review them before running anything.
# Patch Next advisory brief: CVE-2026-77526 Advisory: FacturaScripts: Path traversal in UploadedFile::move() via getClientOriginalName() — arbitrary file write outside MyFiles/ leading to RCE IDs: CVE-2026-77526, GHSA-hgjx-r89m-m7v4 Record: https://patchnext.com/advisories/ghsa-hgjx-r89m-m7v4 (revision 3, source checked 3 Nov 2026, 06:10 UTC) Inventory: none attached. This brief comes from a public page and does not say whether any deployment is affected. Severity: Critical (CVSS 9.9) Exploitation: no confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next confirms exploitation only from CISA KEV. Vendor response: Vendor fix available; fixed versions by package: facturascripts/facturascripts 2026.3. A vendor fix does not mean a deployment is fixed. ## Affected components - Packagist facturascripts/facturascripts: affected >= 2025, < 2026.3; fixed in 2026.3 ## Suggested inspection (read-only) - Packagist facturascripts/facturascripts: check the installed version with your package manager. ## Supported action Upgrade each affected component to a fixed version on its release line. For a transitive dependency, upgrade the parent package or add an override or constraint, then regenerate the lockfile. Redeploy every environment that ran an affected version. ## Required regression checks - Run the test suite and a production build. - Exercise the features that depend on facturascripts/facturascripts. - Repeat the inspection and confirm that only fixed versions remain installed. ## Rollback considerations - Keep the previous lockfile and deployment artifact. Rolling back reinstates the vulnerable version, so apply any documented mitigation while you fix forward. ## Unresolved questions - Which deployments run an affected version? - Exploitation status can change. Check again before lowering the priority. - Mark the work resolved only after the fixed version is verified in production. ## Sources - Verified: https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-hgjx-r89m-m7v4 (GitHub-reviewed advisory GHSA-hgjx-r89m-m7v4 lists affected ranges: Packagist facturascripts/facturascripts >=2025 <=2026.2) - Verified: https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GHSA-hgjx-r89m-m7v4 (OSV record GHSA-hgjx-r89m-m7v4 lists affected ranges: Packagist facturascripts/facturascripts >=2025 <2026.3 (fixed)) Commands are suggestions: review each one before running it.
Loading voting…