CometBFT is unstability during blocksync when syncing from malicious peer

Exploitation

No confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next marks exploitation only from CISA KEV.

CVSS

not scored

EPSS

No dated EPSS signal available.

As published by the source; long descriptions are shortened.

Name: ASA-2024-008: Instability during blocksync when syncing from malicious peer Component: CometBFT Criticality: Medium (ACMv1: I:Moderate; L: Possible) Affected versions: < v0.38.7 Summary An issue was identified for nodes syncing on an existing network during blocksync in which a malicious peer could cause the syncing peer to panic, enter into a catastrophic invalid syncing state or get stuck in blocksync mode, never switching to consensus. It is recommended for all clients to adopt this patch so that blocksync functions as expected and is tolerant of malicious peers presenting invalid data in this situation. Nodes that are vulnerable to this state may experience a Denial of Service condition in which syncing will not work as expected when joining a network as a client. Recognition This issue was reported to the Cosmos Bug Bounty Program on HackerOne on 5/01/24 by unknownfeature. If you believe you have found a bug in the Interchain Stack or would like to contribute to the…

Published by the source

28 Jun 2024, 14:33 UTC

Last modified by the source

5 Jul 2024, 21:31 UTC

Source last checked

26 Oct 2026, 15:04 UTC

1. Revision 1 · created · 26 Oct 2026

   Published from ghsa record GHSA-hg58-rf2h-6rr7

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# Patch Next advisory brief: GHSA-hg58-rf2h-6rr7

Advisory: CometBFT is unstability during blocksync when syncing from malicious peer
IDs: GHSA-hg58-rf2h-6rr7
Record: https://patchnext.com/advisories/ghsa-hg58-rf2h-6rr7 (revision 1, source checked 26 Oct 2026, 15:04 UTC)
Inventory: none attached. This brief comes from a public page and does not say whether any deployment is affected.
Severity: Unrated
Exploitation: no confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next confirms exploitation only from CISA KEV.
Vendor response: Vendor fix available; fixed versions by package: github.com/cometbft/cometbft 0.38.8, 0.37.7. A vendor fix does not mean a deployment is fixed.

## Affected components
- Go github.com/cometbft/cometbft: affected >= 0.37.0, < 0.37.7; >= 0.38.0, < 0.38.8; fixed in 0.38.8, 0.37.7

## Suggested inspection (read-only)
- Go github.com/cometbft/cometbft: check the installed version with your package manager.

## Supported action
Upgrade each affected component to a fixed version on its release line. For a transitive dependency, upgrade the parent package or add an override or constraint, then regenerate the lockfile. Redeploy every environment that ran an affected version.

## Required regression checks
- Run the test suite and a production build.
- Exercise the features that depend on github.com/cometbft/cometbft.
- Repeat the inspection and confirm that only fixed versions remain installed.

## Rollback considerations
- Keep the previous lockfile and deployment artifact. Rolling back reinstates the vulnerable version, so apply any documented mitigation while you fix forward.

## Unresolved questions
- Which deployments run an affected version?
- Exploitation status can change. Check again before lowering the priority.
- Mark the work resolved only after the fixed version is verified in production.

## Sources
- Verified: https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-hg58-rf2h-6rr7 (GitHub-reviewed advisory GHSA-hg58-rf2h-6rr7 lists affected ranges: Go github.com/cometbft/cometbft >=0.37.0 =0.38.0 <0.38.8)

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