Poweradmin: API user-update endpoint leads to a non-admin reset any user's password and take over the superuser account

Exploitation

No confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next marks exploitation only from CISA KEV.

CVSS

8.8 · CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

EPSS

No dated EPSS signal available.

As published by the source; long descriptions are shortened.

Summary The REST API user-update endpoint (PUT/PATCH /api/v2/users/{id} and the V1 equivalent) does not enforce two authorization rules that the web interface enforces. A user who holds the usereditothers permission but is not a superuser can: 1. edit user accounts that belong to a superuser, and 2. set the password of any account, even without the userpasswdeditothers permission. Because of this, a non-admin "user manager" role can send a single API request that changes the administrator's password, then log in as the administrator. This is a full privilege escalation and account takeover. The same actions are explicitly blocked in the web UI, so the API is inconsistent with the application's own permission model. Details Poweradmin's permission model treats these as three distinct permissions: - usereditothers (id 57): "User is allowed to edit other users." - userpasswdeditothers (id 58): "User is allowed to edit the password of other users." - userisueberuser (id 53): full admin.…

Published by the source

24 Jul 2026, 21:54 UTC

Last modified by the source

24 Jul 2026, 21:54 UTC

Source last checked

26 Oct 2026, 14:50 UTC

1. Revision 1 · created · 26 Oct 2026

   Published from ghsa record GHSA-h4hf-v6w5-897x

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# Patch Next advisory brief: GHSA-h4hf-v6w5-897x

Advisory: Poweradmin: API user-update endpoint leads to a non-admin reset any user's password and take over the superuser account
IDs: GHSA-h4hf-v6w5-897x
Record: https://patchnext.com/advisories/ghsa-h4hf-v6w5-897x (revision 1, source checked 26 Oct 2026, 14:50 UTC)
Inventory: none attached. This brief comes from a public page and does not say whether any deployment is affected.
Severity: High (CVSS 8.8)
Exploitation: no confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next confirms exploitation only from CISA KEV.
Vendor response: Vendor fix available; fixed versions by package: poweradmin/poweradmin 4.3.4, 4.2.5. A vendor fix does not mean a deployment is fixed.

## Affected components
- Packagist poweradmin/poweradmin: affected >= 4.0.0, < 4.2.5; >= 4.3.0, < 4.3.4; fixed in 4.3.4, 4.2.5

## Suggested inspection (read-only)
- Packagist poweradmin/poweradmin: check the installed version with your package manager.

## Supported action
Upgrade each affected component to a fixed version on its release line. For a transitive dependency, upgrade the parent package or add an override or constraint, then regenerate the lockfile. Redeploy every environment that ran an affected version.

## Required regression checks
- Run the test suite and a production build.
- Exercise the features that depend on poweradmin/poweradmin.
- Repeat the inspection and confirm that only fixed versions remain installed.

## Rollback considerations
- Keep the previous lockfile and deployment artifact. Rolling back reinstates the vulnerable version, so apply any documented mitigation while you fix forward.

## Unresolved questions
- Which deployments run an affected version?
- Exploitation status can change. Check again before lowering the priority.
- Mark the work resolved only after the fixed version is verified in production.

## Sources
- Verified: https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-h4hf-v6w5-897x (GitHub-reviewed advisory GHSA-h4hf-v6w5-897x lists affected ranges: Packagist poweradmin/poweradmin >=4.0.0 =4.3.0 <4.3.4)

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